Background
Mavric Jordan Smith was convicted in Greenville County of criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the second degree, kidnapping, and incest, and was sentenced to concurrent terms of sixteen years’ imprisonment. At trial, the State called a witness qualified as an expert in pediatric and child sexual abuse (the expert) to testify about the victim. The expert relayed statements the victim had made to her, including statements about events beyond the immediate time and place of the sexual assault. Smith objected, arguing the expert’s testimony improperly bolstered the victim’s credibility. The trial court overruled the objection and denied a request for a curative instruction. On appeal, Smith argued both that the testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay and that it improperly bolstered the victim’s credibility.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed under Rule 220(b), SCACR, on both grounds.
Hearsay argument not preserved. Smith’s objection at trial was limited to improper bolstering. He never argued to the trial court that the expert’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay because it went beyond the time and place of the sexual assault or was not made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. Under South Carolina’s preservation rules, “[a] party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal.” State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142 (2003). The hearsay theory was therefore not preserved for review. Separately, to the extent Smith argued on appeal that the inherently corroborative nature of the expert’s testimony constituted improper bolstering, that specific argument was also unpreserved because Smith’s trial objection lacked the specificity needed to alert the trial court to that theory. See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76 (1998) (“[A]n objection must be sufficiently specific to inform the trial court of the point being urged by the objector.”).
No improper bolstering. On the merits of the preserved bolstering objection, the court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Improper bolstering occurs when a witness testifies for the purpose of conveying—directly or indirectly—a belief in the victim’s credibility, without serving some other valid purpose. Chappell v. State, 429 S.C. 68, 75 (Ct. App. 2019); State v. Jennings, 394 S.C. 473, 480 (2011) (“For an expert to comment on the veracity of a child’s accusations of sexual abuse is improper.”). Here, the expert did not opine that she believed the victim. Instead, she relayed information the victim provided to her for the purpose of determining what testing and treatment the child required. Because the testimony served a valid diagnostic purpose—explaining the basis for the expert’s clinical decisions—rather than conveying a belief in the victim’s credibility, it did not constitute improper bolstering. See State v. Kromah, 401 S.C. 340, 358–59 (2013) (experts may not opine on the credibility of others, but may convey information received from a patient that informed diagnostic decisions).
Key Takeaways
- When a defendant objects on one ground at trial (bolstering) and attempts to raise a different ground on appeal (hearsay), the appellate argument is unpreserved; preservation requires not only that an issue be raised in the trial court but that it be raised on the same legal theory asserted on appeal.
- A bolstering objection must be stated with sufficient specificity to alert the trial court to the precise argument being raised; a generic bolstering objection does not preserve every possible theory of improper bolstering for appeal.
- An expert in child sexual abuse does not improperly bolster the victim’s testimony by relaying statements the victim made to the expert for diagnostic and treatment purposes; the key distinction is whether the testimony conveys a belief in the victim’s credibility or instead serves a valid, independent clinical function.
Why It Matters
The improper-bolstering doctrine in child sexual abuse cases is one of the most frequently litigated evidentiary issues in South Carolina criminal courts. The central rule is clear—a witness may not vouch for the victim’s credibility, directly or indirectly—but the application of that rule to expert testimony relaying a child’s statements is nuanced. Mavric Smith reaffirms the established line: an expert who describes the information a child victim provided during a medical or clinical interview, and explains how that information informed the expert’s diagnostic and treatment decisions, is not offering an opinion about the child’s truthfulness. The testimony is about the expert’s clinical process, not about whether the child should be believed.
The preservation holding is equally important for practitioners. Broad, undifferentiated bolstering objections risk being overruled on the merits and also risk failing to preserve more specific arguments (such as hearsay or the inherent-corroboration theory) that depend on distinct legal theories. When objecting to expert testimony about child victims, counsel should state the specific legal theory with precision and ensure the objection covers every ground that might be pursued on appeal.