Background
David Lee Graham pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924. The Eastern District of North Carolina sentenced him to 180 months in prison followed by five years of supervised release.
At sentencing, the district court orally required Graham to submit to warrantless searches by law-enforcement or probation officers of “your person, your property, your house, your residence, your vehicle, and the effects thereof.” The written judgment instead authorized searches of Graham’s person and “any property, house, residence, vehicle, and effects.” Graham argued that substituting “any” for “your” materially expanded the condition beyond what the court pronounced.
The Court’s Holding
In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Fourth Circuit agreed that the written condition materially differed from the orally pronounced condition. Relying on United States v. Rogers and its reasoning in United States v. Sirak, the court held that the discrepancy constituted a Rogers error.
The court affirmed Graham’s conviction, vacated his entire sentence, and remanded for a full resentencing. It also denied Graham’s request to file a pro se supplemental brief because he was represented by counsel who had filed merits briefs.
Key Takeaways
- A written supervised-release condition may not materially broaden the discretionary condition pronounced at sentencing.
- Changing the search condition from Graham’s property and residences to “any” property and residences created a material discrepancy.
- Under Fourth Circuit precedent, a Rogers error requires vacatur of the sentence and a full resentencing.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores that the oral pronouncement of discretionary supervised-release conditions controls and that seemingly small wording changes in the written judgment can materially alter a defendant’s obligations. When such a discrepancy amounts to a Rogers error, the Fourth Circuit’s remedy is not merely correction of the judgment but full resentencing.