State v. Castleberry — Murder conviction vacated over erroneous self-defense jury instructions

Case
State of Arizona v. Whitney Lee Castleberry
Court
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Judge
David D. Weinzweig (Doug Ducey, 2017); Michael J. Brown (Janet Napolitano, 2007); Veronika Fabian (Katie Hobbs, 2025)
Date Decided
August 14, 2026
Docket No.
1 CA-CR 24-0594
Topics
Self-defense; Jury instructions; Domestic violence; Criminal trespass
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Whitney Lee Castleberry and Joe, the father of her child, had an on-and-off relationship and lived together in an apartment leased solely in Castleberry’s name. Joe paid rent to Castleberry. After he previously kicked in the apartment door following a lockout, Castleberry called police and paid for the repairs.

In May 2021, after Joe allegedly elbowed and slapped Castleberry, she told him to leave and locked the door after he went outside. Joe later returned, pounded on the door, and pushed it into Castleberry after she opened it slightly. Castleberry fired a gun, striking and killing him. A jury convicted her of second-degree murder, rejecting five asserted justification defenses, and the superior court imposed a 15-year prison sentence.

The Court’s Holding

The court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial. It held that the superior court wrongly modified the defense-of-premises instruction to tell jurors that a person with an “absolute and unlimited right” to be in a dwelling cannot commit criminal trespass. The instruction improperly shifted the statutory question from whether Castleberry reasonably believed Joe was trespassing to Joe’s legal property rights.

The court also held that instructions drawn from Arizona’s civil Residential Landlord-Tenant Act did not belong in the criminal trial. Those instructions, together with the prosecutor’s argument that Castleberry could only pursue eviction rather than use force, could have led jurors to regard her as legally barred from asserting justification. The errors were not harmless. Separately, the court ruled that Castleberry was entitled to the statutory presumptions under A.R.S. § 13-419 because there was at least slight evidence that Joe exceeded any invitation to be in the apartment and was attempting unlawful or forcible entry.

Key Takeaways

  • A defense-of-premises claim turns on the defendant’s reasonable belief that a trespass was occurring, not the alleged trespasser’s civil tenancy status.
  • Civil landlord-tenant rules governing eviction cannot be used to disqualify a criminal defendant’s justification defense.
  • An invitee may become a trespasser by exceeding the scope of the invitation, potentially triggering the presumptions in A.R.S. § 13-419.

Why It Matters

The decision emphasizes that justification instructions in domestic-violence cases must remain focused on the defendant’s reasonable perceptions and the governing criminal statutes. Shared residence, tenancy, or access to a dwelling does not itself defeat a justification defense.

It also cautions trial courts against using civil property-law concepts in a way that transforms factual justification questions into legal barriers to self-defense or defense-of-premises claims.

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