People v. Cook — remanded for the trial court to decide whether probation time merits sentence credit

Case
The People of the State of Illinois v. Daniel Allen Cook
Court
Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District
Judge
Justice Harris; Justice Zenoff; Justice Doherty
Date Decided
September 1, 2026
Docket No.
Nos. 4-25-1300, 4-25-1302 (consolidated)
Topics
Probation revocation; Sentence credit; DUI; Criminal sentencing
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Daniel Allen Cook pleaded guilty in McLean County to aggravated driving under the influence and received 48 months of drug-court probation. While on probation, he was charged with driving while his license was revoked and other traffic offenses. He admitted the probation violation, and the trial court resentenced him to five years in prison for aggravated DUI. Cook also pleaded guilty to the new driving-while-revoked charge and received a concurrent two-year prison term.

Cook later sought to amend the mittimus under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472, requesting credit for more than five years spent on probation. The trial court denied the request, reasoning that the statute did not apply because Cook sought credit for time when he was on probation rather than actually in custody.

The Court’s Holding

The appellate court held that the trial court failed to exercise the discretion granted by section 5-6-4(h) of the Unified Code of Corrections. That provision allows a court, after revoking probation and resentencing a defendant, to award credit for time spent on probation even when that time was noncustodial.

The trial court instead acted on the erroneous belief that section 5-6-4(h) did not apply to probation time outside custody. The appellate court remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to decide, in its discretion, whether Cook should receive credit. It expressed no view on whether credit should ultimately be awarded.

Key Takeaways

  • Section 5-6-4(h) permits discretionary credit for noncustodial time spent on probation after probation is revoked.
  • Such credit is not automatic under the current statute.
  • A court errs when it declines to exercise discretion because it mistakenly believes it lacks that authority.

Why It Matters

The decision distinguishes discretionary probation-time credit from presentence custody credit. Sentencing courts must recognize that section 5-6-4(h) permits them to consider noncustodial probation time, then make an actual discretionary determination based on the case before them.

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