Background
An Ohio Circuit Court jury convicted Steven Minton of six counts of first-degree rape of D.B., a child under 12, and recommended life imprisonment. D.B. testified that Minton repeatedly raped her while she lived with him and her mother. A physician found a healed, full-depth injury to D.B.’s hymen that was consistent with child sexual abuse. Minton denied the allegations.
Before trial, Minton sought to introduce evidence that Wayne Moxley had been convicted of sexually abusing D.B., arguing that Moxley could have caused her injury or supplied her knowledge of sexual matters. He also sought testimony from former foster mother Emily Rowell that a state investigation had not substantiated a later sexual-abuse allegation by D.B. against another man. The trial court excluded both categories of evidence. After the verdict, the parties learned that one charged rape had occurred in neighboring Grayson County rather than Ohio County, but the court denied Minton’s motion to dismiss that count.
The Court’s Holding
The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the trial court properly excluded the Moxley evidence under Kentucky’s rape-shield rule and the rules governing relevance. Nothing in the proffer showed that Moxley’s conduct involved vaginal penetration, ejaculation, or anything else capable of causing the hymenal injury or explaining D.B.’s knowledge of ejaculation. Excluding irrelevant evidence did not arbitrarily or disproportionately impair Minton’s constitutional right to present a defense.
The Court also upheld the exclusion of evidence concerning D.B.’s allegation against the man in her foster home. A prior sexual-abuse allegation may be used to challenge a complainant’s credibility only after a preliminary showing that it was demonstrably false. An investigation’s failure to substantiate an allegation, without affirmative evidence of falsity, did not satisfy that standard. Minton did not preserve his separate objection to restrictions on questioning D.B. about the allegation, and any error would have been harmless.
Finally, the Court held that the discovery that one rape occurred in Grayson County did not require dismissal. The county where an offense occurred was not an element of first-degree rape, and Kentucky circuit courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over offenses committed anywhere in the Commonwealth. The county issue concerned venue, which Minton waived by failing to seek a transfer before trial; the Ohio County Commonwealth’s Attorney therefore acted within the office’s authority in prosecuting the charge. Justice Thompson dissented without a separate opinion in the supplied text.
Key Takeaways
- Evidence of another person’s sexual misconduct against a victim is not admissible as an alternative source of injury or sexual knowledge without evidence connecting that conduct to the particular injury or knowledge at issue.
- A merely unsubstantiated prior sexual-abuse allegation is not “demonstrably false” and ordinarily cannot be used to impeach a complaining witness.
- Trying a Kentucky offense in the wrong county presents a waivable venue issue, not a defect in the circuit court’s subject-matter jurisdiction or an evidentiary failure on an element of the crime.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the evidentiary foundation defendants must establish before Kentucky courts will admit rape-shield evidence involving other alleged perpetrators or prior accusations. Speculation that another person caused an injury, or reliance solely on an agency’s inability to substantiate an allegation, is insufficient.
It also emphasizes the distinction between jurisdiction and venue in Kentucky criminal cases. A defendant generally must raise improper venue before trial, and counsel may use a bill of particulars to identify the alleged location of an offense. The opinion is designated not to be published and is not binding precedent, though Kentucky’s appellate rules permit limited citation of qualifying unpublished opinions.