Background
Tiernan Quinn Golembiewski and AS began dating in May 2024 and soon moved into an apartment together. After an argument following a July 4 gathering, AS said Golembiewski repeatedly strangled and assaulted her, took her phone, prevented her from leaving or seeking help, and subjected her to sexual conduct. Golembiewski testified that AS attacked him with a curling iron and that he impulsively reached out to defend himself, accidentally grabbing and briefly squeezing her neck.
A jury convicted Golembiewski of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, domestic violence, and unlawful imprisonment. It did not reach verdicts on two criminal-sexual-conduct charges, which were later dismissed by nolle prosequi. Sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender, Golembiewski received 15 to 30 years’ imprisonment for each of the assault and unlawful-imprisonment convictions and 93 days in jail for domestic violence.
On appeal, Golembiewski challenged the exclusion of his reference to AS’s alleged prior domestic-violence arrest, the sufficiency of the unlawful-imprisonment evidence, the refusal to give a self-defense instruction, and the assessment of 50 points under offense variable 7.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the reference to AS’s alleged arrest. To the extent the evidence was offered to suggest that AS acted in conformity with a violent or aggressive character, it was inadmissible propensity evidence. Golembiewski also failed to substantiate the alleged incident, explain what he knew about it, or develop a nonpropensity basis for admission under MRE 404(b). Its exclusion therefore did not violate his right to present a defense.
The evidence was sufficient to prove unlawful imprisonment because AS testified that Golembiewski used violence and threats to restrict her movements, physically prevented her from leaving, took control of her phone, and impersonated her in a message to her mother. A rational juror could find that he restrained AS to continue committing the assault and acted to keep her confinement secret.
The trial court’s stated reason for denying a self-defense instruction was flawed because Golembiewski’s testimony supported a finding that he intentionally used some physical force, even though he claimed the neck grab was accidental. The appellate court did not decide whether another basis justified refusing the instruction, however, because any error was not outcome-determinative given the extensive photographic, medical, and testimonial evidence contradicting his account. The court also upheld the 50-point score for OV 7, concluding that repeatedly strangling AS, releasing her to breathe, and then strangling her again constituted torture under MCL 777.37(1)(a).
Key Takeaways
- Evidence of a victim’s prior alleged misconduct cannot be used merely to show a violent character and conduct consistent with that character; a defendant seeking admission for another purpose must adequately develop its relevance and factual basis.
- Unlawful imprisonment may be established through violence or threats restricting a victim’s movement, and interference with the victim’s communications may support a finding of secret confinement.
- A self-defense instruction requires evidence supporting the defense, including intentional force, but an erroneous refusal to give the instruction does not warrant reversal unless the error was outcome-determinative.
- Repeated strangulation that inflicts intense physical and psychological suffering may qualify as torture supporting 50 points under OV 7.
Why It Matters
The unpublished decision illustrates the evidentiary foundation required when a defendant invokes “reverse 404(b)” principles to introduce a victim’s alleged prior act. A bare reference to an arrest, without details connecting it to a permissible and material purpose, does not establish admissibility or a constitutional violation.
The opinion also clarifies that testimony describing an impulsive defensive act may supply the intentional-use-of-force component of self-defense even when the defendant denies intending the precise injury. Nevertheless, overwhelming contrary evidence can render the omission of a self-defense instruction harmless.