Background
William Motten, Jr. opened fire during a dispute at a private club, shooting two people who survived. During the same episode, Edward Jarette was fatally shot in the chest. A jury acquitted Motten of first-degree murder, and a subsequent jury convicted him of two counts of assault with intent to murder, felon in possession of a firearm, and felony-firearm.
At sentencing, the trial court assessed 100 points under Offense Variable 3 because a death resulted from the commission of a crime and homicide was not the sentencing offense. That assessment increased Motten’s guidelines range from 126 to 210 months to 171 to 285 months. The court sentenced him to 285 to 700 months for each assault conviction, three to five years for felon in possession, and two years for felony-firearm. Motten later sought relief from judgment, arguing that People v. Beck barred the court from relying on conduct underlying his murder acquittal. After earlier appellate proceedings, the Michigan Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ prior opinion and remanded for consideration of the acquittal’s effect on the OV 3 score and Beck’s applicability.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Motten’s successive motion for relief from judgment. It held that the first-degree-murder acquittal established only that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of that offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The acquittal did not establish that Jarette had not died or resolve whether Motten’s criminal conduct underlying his assault convictions was a factual, but-for cause of Jarette’s death.
The court also held that the available record supported the trial court’s finding that Motten’s criminal conduct resulted in Jarette’s death, permitting the assessment of 100 points under OV 3. Beck did not apply because the sentencing court did not find that Motten committed first-degree murder or rely on the elements of that acquitted offense. Instead, it relied on the fatal shooting during the same episode and found that Motten’s conduct underlying his convictions was a but-for cause of the death, regardless of whether he acted with the intent and premeditation required for first-degree murder.
Key Takeaways
- An acquittal of first-degree murder does not necessarily resolve whether a death “resulted from the commission of a crime” for purposes of Michigan’s OV 3.
- A 100-point OV 3 score requires a victim’s death to be factually caused by the defendant’s criminal conduct when homicide is not the sentencing offense.
- Beck does not bar a sentencing court from considering a death tied to convicted conduct when the court does not find that the defendant committed the acquitted offense or rely on its elements.
Why It Matters
The decision distinguishes prohibited reliance on acquitted conduct from permissible findings about the consequences of conduct for which a defendant was convicted. Under that distinction, a murder acquittal does not automatically prevent a sentencing court from finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s convicted criminal acts factually caused a death.
The court did not revisit whether Beck applies retroactively because it concluded that Beck was inapplicable regardless of retroactivity.