Background
Police searched Amber Channel’s car after a drug dog alerted and found drug paraphernalia, marijuana, and $5,523 in cash. After her arrest, Channel removed a bag containing 13.3 grams of methamphetamine from between her legs when confronted with a body-cavity-search warrant. The State charged her with several drug offenses, including possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute.
At trial, a detective testified that the amount of methamphetamine and the cash were consistent with distribution rather than personal use. He also testified in rebuttal about calls in which Channel’s boyfriend gave her directions about distributing methamphetamine. A jury convicted Channel, and the district court imposed a 106-month sentence consecutive to sentences in two other cases, awarding six days of jail credit.
On appeal, Channel challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of intent to distribute and sought additional jail credit. While the appeal was pending, a 2026 amendment to K.S.A. 21-6615 barred duplicate credit for custody attributable to multiple consecutive cases and expressly applied to pending direct appeals.
The Court’s Holding
The court affirmed the convictions. Viewing the evidence in the State’s favor, a rational jury could infer an intent to distribute from Channel’s possession of 13.3 grams of methamphetamine, the large amount of cash, the drug-dog alert to the cash, and evidence of calls concerning methamphetamine distribution. Because the State’s case-in-chief was sufficient, the district court had no duty to enter a judgment of acquittal on its own motion.
The court held that applying the 2026 jail-credit amendment to Channel would not violate due process by depriving her of a vested right. The amendment modified, rather than eliminated, the statutory right to jail credit, and Channel had not established a vested right to duplicative credit.
But retroactive application of the amendment violated the federal Ex Post Facto Clause as applied to Channel. Under State v. Ervin’s construction of the pre-2024 statute, Channel was entitled on direct appeal to credit for all time incarcerated pending disposition of her case, even if some time was credited in another consecutive case. The 2026 amendment would take away that benefit and increase the time she must serve. The court therefore vacated the sentence and jail-credit order and remanded for a jail-credit determination consistent with Ervin.
Key Takeaways
- Evidence of drug quantity, substantial cash, and distribution-related calls supported the intent-to-distribute conviction.
- The 2026 amendment did not abolish a vested due-process right to jail credit.
- Its retroactive application nevertheless violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because it increased punishment by eliminating credit available under Ervin.
Why It Matters
The decision distinguishes due-process vested-right analysis from ex post facto analysis. A statutory sentencing change may survive the former yet still be unconstitutional when retroactively applied to lengthen a defendant’s actual incarceration.
For defendants whose offenses predate the 2024 jail-credit amendment and whose cases remain on direct review, the court treated Ervin’s interpretation of the earlier statute as controlling and refused to apply the 2026 anti-duplication rule retroactively.