Background
A jury in the District of Montana convicted Steven Dwayne Scott of attempted coercion and enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (Count 1) and possession of child pornography (Count 2). The district court imposed a 324-month prison sentence, which the Ninth Circuit described as at the low end of the recommended Sentencing Guidelines range. At trial the government presented electronic records, victim and law enforcement testimony, and photographs connecting Scott to the charged conduct. Scott maintained that his electronic accounts were hacked or that he was framed.
Scott moved to exclude evidence of prior child molestation under Federal Rule of Evidence 414, and the district court denied the motion. Two Jane Does testified, and the district court also admitted Scott's prior conviction for sexual abuse of a minor. The government dropped a separate charge, Count 3, for failure to register as a sex offender, and Scott argued on appeal that the prior conviction should then have been excluded. He also argued that Count 1 is not a crime of child molestation under Rule 414 and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable, pointing among other things to his health.
The Court’s Holding
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished memorandum. Reviewing the preserved sufficiency challenge de novo and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it held that a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of both offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was not required to accept Scott's speculative assertion that his accounts were hacked or that he was framed.
On the evidentiary rulings, reviewed for abuse of discretion, the court found no error. As the parties clarified in briefing and at argument, the Jane Doe testimony was not propensity evidence of prior crimes or bad acts as to Count 2 but direct evidence of the child pornography charge. Scott requested no instruction, below or on appeal, limiting that testimony to Count 2. The court did not address his argument that Count 1 is not child molestation under Rule 414, because he did not raise it below and raised it on appeal only in his reply brief, so it was forfeited. The panel added that the issue would at most support an instruction Scott never requested. Scott also forfeited his argument that the prior conviction should have been excluded once Count 3 was dropped, because he did not present it to the district court. Regardless, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the conviction as to Counts 1 and 2 because it demonstrated intent, citing LeMay and, in a see-also citation, Thornhill, which upheld admission of a prior conviction where the defendant contested who downloaded the photographs. The panel also found no abuse of discretion in the Rule 403 and 414 analysis under the LeMay factors, concluding the court did not treat Rule 414 as a blank check.
On the sentence, the panel applied deferential review, vacating only if declining a lesser sentence was illogical, implausible, or unsupported by the record. The district court explained why a significant term was warranted, discussed the seriousness of crimes involving young victims, and found no basis to vary downward. It addressed Scott's health by recommending service in a medical facility. Although it did not mention every mitigating argument, the record showed it listened and found them insufficient to warrant a sentence below the Guidelines range. The judgment was affirmed in full.
Key Takeaways
- Sufficiency review is deferential, and a defendant's speculative claim of hacking or framing does not require a jury to reject strong evidence.
- Testimony from other victims may be direct evidence of a charged child pornography count rather than propensity evidence, so it need not be analyzed as Rule 414 evidence for that count.
- Arguments not raised in the district court, or raised on appeal only in a reply brief, are forfeited and may go unaddressed.
- A prior sexual-abuse conviction may be admitted to show intent where the district court weighs the LeMay factors and Rule 403 prejudice.
- A sentencing court need not mention every mitigating argument or list every § 3553(a) factor if the record shows it considered the arguments and explained its choice.
Why It Matters
This is an unpublished memorandum and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. It applies settled Ninth Circuit standards.
Its lessons are mostly procedural. Defendants who want a limiting instruction or a narrower reading of Rule 414 must request it in the district court and press it in the opening brief. The panel left open whether an enticement offense under § 2422(b) counts as child molestation under Rule 414.