Background
Ryan Lloyd was indicted on March 5, 2019, in Daviess Circuit Court on fourteen counts of promoting a sexual performance by a minor under 16, six counts involving a minor under 18, and three counts of voyeurism. The charges arose from hidden video cameras installed in bathrooms in his home and a neighbor’s home. Represented by retained private counsel, Lloyd pleaded guilty to amended charges: twenty counts of possession of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor under KRS 531.335 and the three original voyeurism counts. The Commonwealth recommended two consecutive five-year sentences, totaling ten years. Lloyd acknowledged discussing possible defenses and the agreement with counsel, understanding its terms, and waiving his trial and appeal rights. At the April 2, 2021, sentencing hearing, counsel sought probation and objected to inclusion of the original charges in the presentence investigation report, but made no other objections or requests. The court accepted the recommendation and denied probation. The opinion also notes that Lloyd received twelve months on the voyeurism counts, which he did not challenge.
Proceeding pro se in March 2024, Lloyd sought appointed counsel and moved under RCr 11.42 to vacate the judgment. He challenged the constitutionality of KRS 531.320—the statute underlying the original indictment, not the possession statute to which he pleaded guilty—and presented factual defenses. The circuit court denied relief, producing Appeal No. 2025-CA-0175-MR. In October 2024, he sought a declaratory judgment under KRS 418.040 and relief under CR 60.02(e) and CR 60.03, repeating the same arguments. Denial of those motions produced Appeal No. 2025-CA-0091-MR. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals, denied appellate appointment of counsel under KRS 31.110(2)(c), and noted that a separate appeal, No. 2025-CA-0219, had been dismissed as duplicative.
The Court’s Holding
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Moynahan affirmed the circuit court’s July 22 and December 12, 2024 orders. The court reviewed the RCr 11.42, CR 60.02, and CR 60.03 denials for abuse of discretion and the declaratory judgment for clear error. It explained that RCr 11.42 remains available despite a guilty plea, but reaches issues that could not have been addressed on direct appeal; the movant must convincingly establish deprivation of a substantial right justifying extraordinary relief.
The court construed Lloyd’s brief as arguing that KRS 531.320 was unconstitutionally vague, that its vagueness coerced his plea, and that his sentence was therefore void. It rejected that argument without deciding whether the statute was vague. The challenge was available before the plea and could have been raised through a motion to dismiss the indictment, at trial, through a properly preserved direct appeal, or through a conditional guilty plea under RCr 8.09. Lloyd did none of those things and never challenged KRS 531.335, the statute of conviction. The court also found no record support for his assertion that he sought to preserve the constitutional issue but the Commonwealth refused.
The court separately rejected Lloyd’s coercion claim. Reviewing the record and sentencing-hearing video, it found the totality of circumstances showed a free, knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea. Lloyd had affirmed voluntariness in his December 18, 2020 motion to plead guilty, and neither he nor counsel suggested otherwise at sentencing. His desire to avoid potentially greater exposure did not establish coercion. His factual arguments about mens rea, “sexual conduct,” and the miniature cameras’ capabilities were waived by the guilty plea and belonged at trial or on direct appeal. Because the CR 60.02(e), CR 60.03, and declaratory-judgment motions duplicated the RCr 11.42 grounds, their denial presented no reversible error. The court did not allege or address ineffective assistance because Lloyd had not raised it.
Key Takeaways
- A guilty plea does not waive the right to file RCr 11.42, but it does not make every pre-plea constitutional objection cognizable there.
- The court held Lloyd’s challenge procedurally unavailable and his plea voluntary; it did not adjudicate KRS 531.320’s constitutionality.
- Duplicative CR 60.02, CR 60.03, and declaratory-judgment requests cannot substitute for direct appeal or RCr 11.42.
- The opinion is marked “Not to Be Published.”
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the distinction between preserving a statutory challenge and attempting to revive it after an unconditional guilty plea. It identifies practical routes—pretrial dismissal, trial, conditional plea, or preserved direct appeal—while tying its waiver and voluntariness conclusions to this record rather than announcing that every appellate-waiver case is identical.
It also reinforces that civil post-judgment mechanisms and declaratory relief cannot simply repackage unsuccessful criminal collateral claims. Attorneys should note the opinion’s unpublished status and its fact-specific treatment of plea voluntariness and forfeiture.