Background
The State charged Juan Soria III by information with assault causing bodily injury–family violence under Texas Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1), alleging that he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly injured his then-wife, G.S., by striking her in the face. A jury convicted him and assessed three months in the Erath County Jail and a $4,000 fine. The trial court made an affirmative family-violence finding and sentenced Soria in accordance with the verdict. He appealed from the County Court at Law in Erath County in trial cause No. 23CRCC-00379.
G.S. testified that Soria awakened her early on August 23, 2023, by slapping her face, accused her of cheating and of conduct involving neighbors, and elbowed her mouth as she reached for her cell phone, causing a busted lip. She left with the couple’s young children, went to her parents’ homes, and her father called police. Stephenville officers took her statement and photographs at the couple’s home. She filed for divorce the next day, and the couple was divorced by trial.
Soria, who represented himself at trial with standby counsel but had counsel on appeal, invoked “the rule” immediately before G.S. testified as the State’s first witness. She remained in court while other witnesses were admonished. After her testimony and cross-examination, the State called her father and three officers. After the State rested, Soria called G.S. as his only witness but first made an oral “motion to dismiss,” which the court clarified sought a mistrial based on her presence during the intervening testimony. The court denied a mistrial and refused to exclude her testimony.
The Court’s Holding
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed and overruled Soria’s sole issue. It explained that when a witness violates the rule, testimony may be admitted or excluded in the trial court’s discretion, reviewable only for abuse of discretion. The purpose of exclusion is to prevent one witness’s testimony from influencing another’s. Article 36.03(a) and Rule 614(d) permit exclusion of a qualifying victim only if the witness will testify and the court determines that hearing other testimony would materially affect that witness’s testimony. The party seeking exclusion bears the burden of an offer of proof.
The court reasoned that the rule could not have affected G.S.’s initial testimony because she testified first. Soria never sought her exclusion afterward as Article 36.03 or Rule 614 contemplated. Rejecting his argument that the court should have advised him of that right, the court stated that a trial judge need not educate an accused about Texas law and that a pro se defendant must follow evidentiary, procedural, and substantive rules.
Independently, the court found no indicated harm. The father’s and officers’ accounts of G.S.’s report did not materially differ from her earlier testimony. When Soria recalled her, he asked no questions about the assault details or her reports to her father or police; instead, he suggested a financial motive related to the divorce. Her later testimony therefore was not materially affected by her courtroom presence. The court did not abuse its discretion by denying relief arising from that presence.
Key Takeaways
- A victim’s exclusion under Article 36.03 and Rule 614(d) requires a showing that hearing other testimony would materially affect the victim’s testimony.
- The party seeking exclusion bears the burden, and a pro se defendant is not entitled to judicial instruction about invoking that right.
- The court alternatively found no harm because the later testimony was not materially affected and the intervening accounts did not materially differ.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the distinct preservation, burden, discretion, and harm requirements surrounding witness-exclusion complaints. It does not establish that a victim may always remain in court; it holds that this record did not show the required material effect or an abuse of discretion.
It also underscores that self-representation does not relieve a defendant of procedural obligations. The memorandum opinion was designated “Do not publish” under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.2(b).