Background
On March 8, 2024, Samuel Howe called police to his home to arrest a wanted fugitive. After the fugitive accused Howe of assault, officers stopped Howe and, with his consent, searched his vehicle. They found multiple rounds of ammunition in both the center console and the trunk. Because dispatch confirmed Howe was prohibited from possessing firearms and ammunition, he was arrested and charged under MCL 750.224f(7).
The charges were procedurally dismissed on March 26, 2024, when the arresting officer was unable to testify at the preliminary examination. Fourteen days later, a detective — believing the dismissal was permanent and unaware that charges would be reissued — ordered the ammunition destroyed pursuant to department policy. Two days after the destruction order, the charges were reauthorized. When defense counsel later sought to inspect the ammunition, it was gone.
Before trial, Howe moved to dismiss, arguing the destruction of the ammunition violated his due-process rights. The trial court denied the motion. At trial, Howe contended the rounds in his center console were inoperable — sand-filled casings used to make jewelry — and that the ammunition in the trunk was not his. The jury rejected both defenses and returned a guilty verdict. Howe was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 18 months of probation and one year in jail held in abeyance.
The Court’s Holding
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Howe failed to establish a due-process violation under either prong of the applicable standard. First, the court found the ammunition was not exculpatory evidence. Even assuming DNA testing had confirmed Howe’s claim that the center-console rounds were sand-filled and inoperable, Howe never claimed the trunk ammunition shared that characteristic. Because MCL 750.224f(7) requires only possession — not that the ammunition be functional — testing the destroyed evidence would not have created a reasonable probability of a different verdict.
Second, because the evidence was at most “potentially useful,” Howe bore the burden of showing the police destroyed it in bad faith under Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 US 51 (1988). The court found no bad faith. The detective who ordered the destruction acted on a court record showing the case had been dismissed, genuinely believed the dismissal was final, and followed department policy. The destruction occurred 14 days after the dismissal notification, before the charges were reissued. The court emphasized that negligent destruction of evidence — even destruction that may have violated a general notification policy — does not equate to bad faith.
The court also declined Howe’s invitation to depart from the Youngblood bad-faith standard, noting that both the Michigan Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have repeatedly recognized and applied it, rendering those decisions controlling precedent under MCR 7.215(J)(1).
Key Takeaways
- A defendant challenging the pre-trial destruction of evidence must show either that the evidence was materially exculpatory or that police acted in bad faith; negligence alone is insufficient to establish a due-process violation.
- Evidence is not “exculpatory” for due-process purposes unless there is a reasonable probability that its existence would have changed the outcome — here, even favorable DNA results could not have negated possession of the trunk ammunition.
- A detective’s good-faith reliance on court records reflecting a case dismissal, without knowledge that charges would be reissued, precludes a finding of bad faith even if the destruction was arguably premature or policy-inconsistent.
- Michigan’s intermediate appellate court is bound by prior Michigan Supreme Court and Court of Appeals decisions applying Youngblood and cannot independently modify the federal bad-faith standard.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the high bar defendants face when challenging pre-trial evidence destruction in Michigan. Prosecutors and courts should note that the ruling turns on the dual-track analysis: if the destroyed evidence is not materially exculpatory on its face, the inquiry shifts entirely to bad faith — and institutional negligence or even a technical policy misstep will not satisfy that standard absent proof of purposeful misconduct aimed at undermining the defense.
For defense practitioners, the case illustrates the importance of lodging early, explicit preservation demands whenever charges may be dismissed and reinstated. Had a formal preservation request been on file before the destruction occurred, the bad-faith calculus — and the department’s policy obligations — might have looked considerably different.