Background
In July 2019, Maycol F. Hernandez Herrera, then twenty-two years old and living in Pennsylvania, was visiting his mother’s Bridgeport home when his sister M invited her high school friend K to come over. After maneuvering K into the bedroom and ordering M to leave, the defendant sexually assaulted K, who was bleeding afterward and purchased emergency contraception. K delayed reporting because of concerns about her family’s immigration status, eventually disclosing the assault to a paralegal in December 2019 and to her school therapist in January 2020. Police opened an investigation and arrested the defendant in January 2021.
At the Bridgeport police station, the defendant signed a Miranda waiver and was interviewed for approximately fifty minutes by Detective Walberto Cotto, Jr. During the interrogation, Cotto twice used false evidence ploys: he falsely told the defendant that his sister M had confirmed the two were alone in the bedroom, and he falsely suggested that K’s underwear was being forensically tested — when in fact police had already decided against testing because K had washed it. Under that pressure, the defendant admitted to having sexual intercourse with K and placing his hand over her face. He was convicted after a jury trial of sexual assault in the first degree, unlawful restraint in the second degree, and failure to appear in the first degree.
Two additional issues arose at trial. Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress his statements, arguing he had not validly waived his Miranda rights and that the interrogation environment was coercive; the trial court denied that motion. During jury deliberations, two exhibits — a video recording and transcript of K’s prior statement to police, which had been marked for identification only and never admitted into evidence — were inadvertently sent to the jury room. The jury sent a note to the court indicating uncertainty about whether it should have those materials, and confirmed in writing that it had not reviewed them. The court gave a curative instruction and conducted a Brown inquiry; when defense counsel nonetheless moved for a mistrial, the court denied that motion as well.
The Court’s Holding
The Appellate Court affirmed the conviction on both grounds. On the suppression issue, the court found that the defendant had failed to preserve his specific argument about false evidence ploys below — his written motion addressed only Miranda waiver and right to counsel, not deceptive tactics — so the claim was reviewed under the Golding framework for unpreserved constitutional claims. Applying a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis consistent with State v. Griffin, 339 Conn. 631 (2021), the court concluded that Cotto’s two misrepresentations did not overbear the defendant’s will or render his statements involuntary. The fifty-minute interrogation, the defendant’s valid and documented Miranda waiver, the availability of translation assistance, the defendant’s apparent lucidity and demeanor, and the absence of physical coercion all weighed against a finding of involuntariness.
On the mistrial issue, the court held that the trial court properly exercised its discretion under State v. Brown, 235 Conn. 502 (1995), by questioning the jury, receiving written confirmation that the jurors had not reviewed exhibits 4A or 4B, issuing a curative instruction, and subsequently obtaining a further written confirmation that the incident had not created any bias. The court noted that defense counsel had twice affirmatively stated the Brown inquiry was sufficient before later reversing course to seek a mistrial. The defendant failed to demonstrate that his right to an impartial jury had been violated.
Key Takeaways
- Under Connecticut law, police use of false evidence ploys — such as fabricating witness statements or claiming untested evidence was tested — does not automatically render a resulting confession involuntary; courts assess such deception within the totality of the circumstances, including Miranda compliance, interrogation length, and the defendant’s personal characteristics.
- A defendant who fails to raise a specific suppression argument before the trial court (here, deceptive interrogation tactics as distinct from Miranda waiver) must satisfy the four-prong Golding standard on appeal, and will fail at the third prong if the record does not establish an actual constitutional violation.
- When exhibits inadvertently reach the jury room, a trial court’s Brown inquiry — including written confirmation from the jury that it did not review the materials — may suffice to deny a mistrial, particularly where defense counsel expressly approved the inquiry before subsequently moving for a mistrial.
- Connecticut’s 2023 statute (General Statutes § 54-86q) creating a rebuttable presumption of involuntariness for statements obtained through deceptive tactics applies only to interrogations occurring on or after October 1, 2023, and does not cover false evidence ploys used against adults even prospectively.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces Connecticut’s adherence to a flexible, totality-of-the-circumstances test for confession voluntariness, declining to categorically prohibit false evidence ploys against adult suspects even as the legislature has moved to restrict them in interrogations of juveniles. Defense practitioners should note that arguments about deceptive interrogation tactics must be distinctly raised at the suppression hearing — not merely implied through general cross-examination — or they risk being reviewed only under the more demanding Golding standard on appeal.
The opinion also offers practical guidance on managing inadvertent jury exposure to excluded exhibits. A prompt, well-documented Brown inquiry with written jury responses and a clear curative instruction will likely defeat a subsequent mistrial motion, especially where defense counsel has affirmatively signed off on the adequacy of the court’s remedial steps before pivoting to demand more drastic relief.