Background
In October 2023, a Stark County district court issued a disorderly conduct restraining order (DCRO) against Richard Romanyshyn, with two minor children listed as protected parties. The order was personally served on Romanyshyn, and he did not appeal it. Between November and December 2023, Romanyshyn allegedly violated the DCRO by sending text messages to one or more of the protected parties, and in January 2024 the State charged him with a class A misdemeanor under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-01.
A separate DCRO was later issued against Romanyshyn in Hettinger County in April 2024, involving the same petitioner and protected parties. Romanyshyn appealed that order, and in January 2025 the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the Hettinger County DCRO and remanded for a full evidentiary hearing. Davis v. Romanyshyn, 2025 ND 18, 16 N.W.3d 464. Seizing on that ruling, Romanyshyn moved to dismiss the Stark County criminal charge, arguing the reversal invalidated the underlying basis for the DCRO he was accused of violating.
The district court denied the motion to dismiss following briefing and its own legal research, without holding an evidentiary hearing. Romanyshyn entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to appeal. After a prior remand to correct the judgment’s failure to reflect the conditional nature of the plea, the Supreme Court reached the merits of his appeal.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court affirmed the amended criminal judgment on all grounds. First, the Court held that no factual findings were required in the district court’s order because Romanyshyn’s motion raised a pure question of law — whether the Hettinger County reversal invalidated the Stark County DCRO — and neither party disputed the underlying procedural facts or requested an evidentiary hearing. The absence of detailed findings did not prevent meaningful appellate review.
Second, the Court rejected Romanyshyn’s argument that the district court improperly took judicial notice of adjudicative facts by conducting its own legal research. The Court explained that N.D.R.Ev. 201 governs judicial notice of adjudicative facts only, and that independent judicial research on a legal question falls entirely outside that rule. The Court also noted an internal contradiction in Romanyshyn’s position: he simultaneously claimed the court made no factual findings and that it improperly noticed adjudicative facts — logically incompatible contentions.
Third, the Court declined to address the merits of whether the motion to dismiss was properly denied as an improper collateral attack on the DCRO — the State’s principal argument — because Romanyshyn failed to brief or reply on that issue. The Court affirmed on the grounds argued and adequately presented.
Key Takeaways
- The reversal of a restraining order in one county proceeding does not automatically invalidate a separate restraining order issued in a different county, even when the same parties and facts are involved.
- A district court denying a motion to dismiss based on a pure legal question need not make formal factual findings; the absence of factual disputes makes such findings unnecessary for appellate review.
- Independent legal research by a trial court does not constitute judicial notice of adjudicative facts under N.D.R.Ev. 201, which applies only to factual matters ordinarily proven through evidence.
- Failure to brief the merits of an issue — including in a reply brief — will result in the appellate court declining to address it.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that defendants charged with violating a restraining order cannot escape criminal liability by mounting a collateral attack on the validity of the order in the criminal proceeding, particularly when they failed to appeal or otherwise challenge the order at the time it was issued. The ruling draws a clean line between the Stark County and Hettinger County proceedings, making clear that each DCRO stands or falls on its own procedural history.
The case also provides useful clarification on the scope of N.D.R.Ev. 201: attorneys should not conflate a court’s independent legal research with the formal judicial-notice procedure, which is limited to adjudicative facts. Practitioners defending against restraining-order violations should be prepared to directly brief the merits of any collateral-validity argument and cannot rely on a favorable ruling in parallel proceedings to carry the argument for them.