Background
Mylan Pettigrew was indicted in Montgomery County on one count of fourth-degree felony failure to comply with the order or signal of a police officer under R.C. 2921.331(B). After his indictment, Pettigrew moved the trial court to impose intervention in lieu of conviction (ILC) under R.C. 2951.041, a statutory mechanism that allows a court to stay criminal proceedings and order rehabilitation when drug or alcohol use was a factor in the offense. Pettigrew argued that substance abuse contributed to the charged conduct and that ILC was therefore appropriate.
The trial court denied the motion in February 2026, ruling that Pettigrew was categorically ineligible for ILC under R.C. 2951.041(B)(10). That provision bars ILC for any offender charged with an offense that would result in disqualification from operating a commercial motor vehicle under Chapter 4506 of the Revised Code. Because a conviction for fourth-degree felony failure to comply carries a mandatory driver’s license suspension under R.C. 2921.331(E), and because a valid driver’s license is a statutory prerequisite to obtaining a commercial driver’s license under R.C. 4506.06(A), the trial court concluded that the mandatory suspension effectively disqualified Pettigrew from operating a commercial motor vehicle.
Following the denial, Pettigrew pleaded no contest, was found guilty, and was sentenced to community control sanctions and a three-year driver’s license suspension. He appealed, raising a single assignment of error challenging the trial court’s interpretation of the ILC eligibility statute.
The Court’s Holding
The Second District affirmed the trial court’s denial of ILC, applying de novo review to the eligibility determination as a question of statutory interpretation. The court focused on the definition of “disqualification” in R.C. 4506.01(G)(1), which includes the “suspension, revocation, or cancellation” of a person’s privileges to operate a commercial motor vehicle. Applying the common meaning of “suspension” — a temporary deprivation of a privilege — the court concluded that Pettigrew’s mandatory driver’s license suspension suspended his privilege to operate a commercial motor vehicle, even though he had never held a commercial driver’s license.
The court reasoned that, before his conviction, Pettigrew held the underlying privilege of operating a commercial motor vehicle because he possessed a valid driver’s license, which is a statutory prerequisite to the commercial driver’s license temporary instruction permit required under R.C. 4506.06(A)(1). Once that driver’s license was suspended, Pettigrew could no longer pursue or exercise that privilege. The court held this constituted “disqualification” under R.C. 4506.01(G)(1), rendering him ineligible for ILC under R.C. 2951.041(B)(10). The court noted alignment with the Twelfth District’s recent decision in State v. Schneider, 2025-Ohio-4625, which reached the same conclusion on materially identical facts.
Key Takeaways
- Any defendant charged with fourth-degree felony failure to comply under R.C. 2921.331(B) is categorically ineligible for ILC because the mandatory driver’s license suspension constitutes “disqualification” from operating a commercial motor vehicle under R.C. 4506.01(G)(1) and R.C. 2951.041(B)(10).
- A defendant need not currently hold a commercial driver’s license for the disqualification bar to apply — it is sufficient that the conviction suspends the underlying privilege to pursue or obtain one.
- The Second and Twelfth Districts are now aligned on this statutory interpretation, signaling a consistent statewide approach on ILC eligibility for this class of offense.
- ILC eligibility is a pure question of law subject to de novo appellate review, with no deference given to the trial court’s statutory construction.
Why It Matters
This decision closes a potential avenue for defendants facing felony failure-to-comply charges to avoid conviction through the ILC rehabilitation pathway. Defense attorneys should advise clients at the outset that the mandatory license suspension tied to a fourth-degree felony charge under R.C. 2921.331(B) is a statutory disqualifier for ILC regardless of whether the client holds or has ever sought a commercial driver’s license. The ruling underscores that the disqualification bar in R.C. 2951.041(B)(10) turns on the legal effect of the mandatory sanction, not on the defendant’s actual CDL status.
More broadly, the decision illustrates how the interplay between licensing prerequisites in Chapter 4506 and the ILC eligibility statute can produce categorical bars that courts will enforce strictly based on plain statutory language. Practitioners handling cases involving mandatory license suspensions — whether for failure to comply, OVI, or other offenses — should carefully evaluate whether those suspensions trigger Chapter 4506 consequences that could foreclose ILC eligibility before advising clients on plea strategy.