Background
Wilfredo Aguilar-Pineda was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of first-degree rape, one count of first-degree sodomy, two counts of second-degree rape, two counts of first-degree sexual abuse, and two counts of luring a minor — all arising from alleged long-term sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, M, who was 15 years old at the time of trial. The case proceeded in Washington County Circuit Court before Judge Erik M. Buchér.
Several evidentiary and procedural disputes marked the trial. The state’s first witness, M, initially refused to testify for 20 to 30 minutes, prompting the trial court and the prosecutor to spend considerable time — including two recesses — attempting to persuade her to take the stand. After eventually agreeing to testify, M answered brief leading questions confirming the alleged abuse occurred. Separately, after learning of M’s accusations and his indictment, defendant gave a false name during a traffic stop and fled to North Carolina, from which he was extradited. The trial court admitted that flight evidence as consciousness of guilt.
The trial court waived all fines, fees, and court-appointed attorney fees, commenting that it did not think defendant would ever pay them, yet simultaneously imposed $2,247.54 in extradition costs without making any finding as to defendant’s ability to pay. Defendant appealed, raising six assignments of error.
The Court’s Holding
The court struck the extradition-cost assessment from the judgment, accepting the state’s concession that imposing such costs without first finding the defendant had the ability to pay was plain error under State v. Velasquez-Orozco, 285 Or App 881 (2017). The court exercised its discretion to correct the error given the amount assessed and defendant’s lengthy prison term.
On the due process challenge to M’s testimony, the court rejected defendant’s second and third assignments, concluding that the trial court’s and prosecutor’s pressure on M to testify — including telling her she could not go home until she answered questions and warning that “nobody gets in trouble” if she complied — did not rise to the level of plain error. The court held the trial court possessed inherent authority and statutory contempt power under ORS 33.096 and ORS 33.015(2)(c) to compel witness testimony, and that the record did not establish it was “beyond dispute” that those actions were so prejudicial as to deny defendant a fair trial under State v. Chitwood, 370 Or 305 (2022).
The court also affirmed admission of the flight evidence — the false name given during the traffic stop and the flight to North Carolina — as properly admitted consciousness-of-guilt evidence under longstanding Oregon precedent. It further rejected, without extended discussion, defendant’s challenge to witnesses using the terms “disclose” or “disclosure,” which the court had previously addressed in State v. Solano, 332 Or App 646 (2024).
Key Takeaways
- Oregon courts may not impose extradition costs on a defendant without first making an affirmative finding of ability to pay; the trial court’s own comment that defendant would “never pay it” underscored the error and warranted correction.
- A trial court’s use of inherent contempt authority to pressure a reluctant minor witness to testify — including telling her she cannot leave until she answers questions — does not automatically constitute reversible plain error or a due process violation, provided the court does not direct the witness to testify favorably to one side.
- Evidence of flight, use of a false name, and extradition is admissible as consciousness of guilt where the record supports an inference the defendant knew of the charges when he fled.
- The appellate court reaffirmed its earlier holding in Solano that prohibiting witnesses from using the terms “disclose” or “disclosure” is not required.
Why It Matters
The decision highlights the procedural obligation Oregon courts have when imposing discretionary financial assessments: even where a court waives other fees, it must separately establish ability to pay before adding extradition costs to a judgment. The case also draws a practical line on judicial management of reluctant witnesses — courts retain broad contempt-based authority to compel testimony, but that authority must stop short of directing the substance of what a witness says.
For practitioners, the ruling underscores the high bar for plain error review when witness-management issues are not preserved below, and confirms that post-indictment flight combined with use of a false name remains fair game as consciousness-of-guilt evidence in Oregon, consistent with decades of Supreme Court precedent.