Background
Daniel Lee Sine pleaded guilty to malicious wounding pursuant to a plea agreement that promised him ten years’ incarceration with all but time served suspended—but only if “no problems [arose] during his release” on bond pending sentencing. The agreement imposed specific conditions: weekly drug screenings and abstinence from alcohol, supervised by a probation officer.
While on presentence release, Sine violated these conditions. He consumed alcohol (testing positive at a drug screening) and committed assault and battery against another individual. The circuit court revoked his bond and remanded him pending sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, Sine’s counsel asked for a sentence at the low end of the guidelines range (3 years 5 months). The trial court sentenced him to 20 years with 4 years active—near the low end requested. Sine responded to the court’s explanation, “Awesome.”
The next day, Sine wrote a pro se letter requesting either resentencing according to the plea agreement or withdrawal of his guilty plea. The court took no action. Sine appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Sine’s request for resentencing was waived under the approbate-reprobate doctrine. Because Sine’s counsel had affirmatively asked for a low-end sentence at trial—and Sine personally approved the result—he could not later take the contradictory position that the sentence violated the plea agreement. This doctrine bars litigants from taking successive inconsistent positions.
The court further held that Sine’s alternative request to withdraw his guilty plea failed the “manifest injustice” standard required for post-sentencing withdrawal. A mere breach of the plea agreement’s conditions does not constitute manifest injustice; only rescission of the agreement itself does. Here, the plea agreement was not rescinded—Sine breached it by consuming alcohol and committing assault and battery, both explicit violations of the release conditions the court had clearly explained to him.
The court distinguished Smith v. Commonwealth, where a defendant could withdraw a plea before sentencing after the trial court rejected the plea agreement. Sine’s post-sentencing withdrawal request faced the higher manifest injustice standard, which he could not meet.
Key Takeaways
- A defendant who requests a favorable sentence at trial cannot later argue the sentence violated a plea agreement.
- Breaching the conditions of a plea agreement—even by consuming alcohol or committing new crimes—does not give the defendant a post-sentencing right to withdraw the guilty plea.
- The approbate-reprobate doctrine applies even when a defendant claims it would prevent a manifest injustice.
- Plea agreements that condition sentencing on presentence conduct must be carefully adhered to; violations trigger the defendant’s loss of the promised sentence.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that defendants bear responsibility for complying with plea agreement conditions during presentence release. Courts will not undo guilty pleas or resentence based on breach of those conditions, and defendants who ask for favorable sentences cannot later repudiate them. The case is significant for criminal practitioners advising clients about the stakes of plea agreements: violating release conditions forecloses post-conviction remedies.
The opinion also clarifies the distinction between plea agreement rescission (which permits withdrawal before sentencing) and breach (which does not). Only when a court affirmatively rejects the agreement itself—not when a defendant breaches it—does withdrawal become available. Sine’s post-sentencing timing and conduct meant he lost even that remedy.