Background
Barry Smith was convicted in 2009 of murder and felony murder in the 1999 death of Michelle McMaster in Waterbury, Connecticut. The victim was found asphyxiated by manual strangulation with evidence of sexual assault. Smith’s conviction rested primarily on testimony from Donna Russell, a witness who stated she saw Smith holding down the victim’s arms while co-defendant Lawrence Andrews choked the victim and a third man pulled down her pants. A second witness, Norman Reynolds, testified that Smith confessed to him while incarcerated, describing his participation in the attack. DNA testing during the investigation identified Daniel’s DNA on a vaginal swab but did not identify Smith’s DNA.
In 2023, Smith filed a postconviction petition under Connecticut General Statutes § 54-102kk(b) seeking DNA testing of fingernail scrapings collected from the victim’s body. Smith argued that exculpatory results—either absence of his DNA or presence of third-party DNA under the victim’s fingernails—would have created a reasonable probability that he would not have been prosecuted or convicted had the evidence been available at trial. The trial court denied the petition, and Smith appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s denial, holding that Smith failed to establish a reasonable probability that DNA testing results would have altered his conviction. The court reasoned that absence of Smith’s DNA on the victim’s fingernails does not necessarily prove he was not present or did not participate in the crime. DNA evidence depends on multiple variables including the amount of DNA each person naturally sheds, the length and nature of physical contact, surface characteristics, and degradation over time. Smith could have held down the victim’s arms without leaving detectable DNA under her fingernails.
The court further held that the presence of third-party DNA would not create a reasonable probability of acquittal. Discovery that another person’s DNA was under the victim’s fingernails would not prove Smith was absent or uninvolved, since the victim could have come into contact with another individual before her death. Most significantly, the court determined that such DNA evidence would not necessarily discredit Russell’s eyewitness testimony that she observed Smith holding down the victim. The DNA results bore little relation to the core credibility determination the jury had already made regarding Russell’s account of events in the basement.
Key Takeaways
- Absence of a defendant’s DNA on a victim does not establish innocence or create a reasonable probability of acquittal when eyewitness testimony places the defendant at the scene and describes his participation in the crime.
- Connecticut postconviction DNA testing petitions under § 54-102kk(b) require a showing that exculpatory results would create a reasonable probability of acquittal—a higher bar than merely showing the evidence might have been helpful or could have undermined some aspect of the prosecution’s case.
- The presence of third-party DNA does not establish a defendant’s non-participation, as it may reflect innocent contact between the victim and others before the crime.
- Courts must evaluate whether DNA evidence would undermine confidence in the jury’s entire verdict, not whether isolated pieces of evidence could be discredited.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the evidentiary standard for postconviction DNA testing in Connecticut and establishes important limitations on when absence of a defendant’s DNA can serve as exculpatory evidence. Critically, the court rejected the notion that DNA testing is automatically warranted whenever biological evidence exists and could theoretically exclude the defendant. Instead, courts must assess whether the most favorable DNA results would actually undermine the totality of evidence presented at trial, particularly when eyewitness testimony directly places the defendant at the scene.
For defendants seeking postconviction relief, the decision underscores that DNA evidence cannot cure fundamental weaknesses in the prosecution’s case, but also that its absence does not automatically invalidate convictions resting on credible eyewitness identification and corroborating admissions. The ruling affects the scope of postconviction DNA testing petitions statewide and reflects judicial recognition that absence of biological evidence is not inherently exculpatory in crimes where non-sexual participation (holding a victim) is charged.