Fourth District holds that police violated the Fourth Amendment by ordering a man out of a residence at gunpoint without a warrant or probable cause and rejects the contrary 1985 Trudell decision.
Sixth District holds that impounding a suspended-license driver’s minivan solely to prevent further illegal driving violates the Fourth Amendment community caretaking doctrine and orders suppression of evidence from the resulting inventory search.
Fourth District holds that an Apple Pay account is a ‘financial account’ excluded from warrantless probation searches and orders suppression of bank evidence obtained through a warrant relying on the unlawful search.
Second District holds that a defendant in custody in another county did not willfully fail to appear for sentencing and that uncertified records from a Fresno court were inadmissible to prove a Cruz waiver violation.
First District holds that a trial court had no sua sponte duty to give a circumstantial evidence instruction in a felon-in-possession case where direct evidence linked the defendant to the cabin containing the guns and ammunition.
Fourth District holds that defense counsel’s brief administrative suspension from the State Bar for trust account reporting noncompliance during trial does not, by itself, establish a denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel.
First District reverses a juvenile court order transferring a 16-year-old murder defendant to adult court because the court did not apply the heightened amenability standards required by AB 2361 and SB 545.
Sixth District holds that even if a search of a deceased suspect’s phone violated the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act, suppression is not required because officers acted in good-faith reliance on the mother’s consent.
Second District affirms convictions for the murder of a Pomona police officer and a separate assault, holding that hot pursuit and concern for family members justified the warrantless entry, but remands to correct determinate-term sentencing under Penal Code section 1170.1.
First District affirms a murder conviction but reverses a drive-by shooting conviction because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on grossly negligent discharge of a firearm as a lesser included offense.
Second District affirms denial of mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, with a notable concurrence sharply criticizing a recent Fourth District decision that overturned a similar denial.
Second District grants writ vacating mental health diversion in a violent hate-crime case, holding that the trial court must consider evidence of past treatment noncompliance when applying the public safety prong of Penal Code section 1001.36.
Fifth District holds (on transfer from the California Supreme Court) that trial courts may impose upper-term sentences based on California Rules of Court rule 4.421(b) factors derived from prior convictions, but vacates the prior-strike finding under People v. Fletcher.
The California Supreme Court holds that assault is not a lesser included offense of resisting an officer by force or violence under Penal Code section 69, because resistance does not require the present ability to inflict harm.
Fourth District reverses a five-year DVRO for the second time, holding the trial court again denied the incarcerated respondent meaningful access to the courts by issuing the order without addressing his request to appear telephonically.
Fourth District affirms a juvenile court’s joint-and-several restitution order, holding the January 2025 amendment to Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 — which replaced joint-and-several liability with several liability based on percentage of fault — does not apply retroactively to a
Second District grants writ of mandate, holding that an indigent petitioner under California’s Racial Justice Act must show only a ‘plausible allegation’ of a violation to obtain counsel — not a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief — and may amend his petition to meet that
Fourth District affirms a trial court order authorizing electroconvulsive therapy for an incarcerated patient with treatment-resistant schizoaffective disorder, holding that ‘no less onerous alternatives’ under Penal Code section 2679(b) refers to medical alternatives, not surrogate-cons
Fourth District grants writ relief, holding that a Riverside County trial court abused its ‘residual’ discretion under Penal Code section 1001.36 by denying mental-health diversion without proper analysis of the statute’s eligibility and suitability criteria.
Fourth District affirms a felony arson conviction but reverses the state-of-emergency sentencing enhancement, holding the 2015 tree-mortality emergency proclamation did not extend statewide and the prosecution failed to prove the fire was in a designated hazard zone.
First District reverses an attempted-lewd-act conviction, holding the trial court violated Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7(d)(1) by failing to explain its reasons for overruling defense counsel’s objection to the prosecutor’s peremptory strike of a prospective juror.
Fourth District affirms a Gun Violence Restraining Order against a father whose adult son with a documented mental-health history threatened a mass shooting at a local high school, holding the order survives Second Amendment, vagueness, and overbreadth challenges.
First District affirms a probation condition allowing warrantless electronics searches as imposed on a defendant who used VOIP and text-message accounts to coordinate the sale of 1,000 fentanyl pills.
Second District affirms denial of section 1172.6 resentencing relief for a defendant convicted of four counts of first-degree murder, holding she remained guilty under current law as a direct aider and abettor with intent to kill — a theory that survived Senate Bill 1437.