State v. Dubois — Six-year delay did not violate speedy-trial right

Case
State v. Benjamin Walter Dubois, III
Court
Court of Appeals of South Carolina
Judge
Per Curiam
Date Decided
2026-09-02
Docket No.
2023-001307
Topics
Criminal Procedure, Constitutional Law, Appellate Procedure
Source
Full opinion on CourtListener · PDF

Background

The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed Benjamin Walter Dubois III’s murder conviction and life-without-parole sentence despite an almost six-year interval between his August 2017 arrest and July 2023 trial. Applying the four-factor test from Barker v. Wingo, the unpublished opinion called the delay “significant and troubling” but held that the total circumstances did not establish a constitutional speedy-trial violation.

Dubois was accused of stabbing a fellow inmate to death at Ridgeland Correctional Institution. One month after his arrest, he wrote the clerk asking for counsel, discovery, and a “fast and speedy trial.” In 2019 he wrote again, saying he had not heard about his request and asking the clerk to file a dismissal motion. A hearing led to new counsel and a plan to try the case in the first half of 2020. The pandemic intervened. The case was eventually scheduled for October 2022, followed by three continuances involving defense counsel’s illness, newly discovered potential evidence, and interruption of Dubois’s psychiatric medication after a transfer.

Dubois formally moved to dismiss in May 2023. The circuit court denied the motion, and trial began about two and a half months later. A jury convicted him of murder.

The Court’s Holding

The panel agreed that nearly six years was presumptively prejudicial, which triggered full review under Barker. It divided the delay into three periods. The first two years and two months, marked by turnover in the solicitor’s office and appointment of a lawyer who no longer handled General Sessions work, counted against the State—but less heavily than deliberate delay. The court also observed that the defense was not prepared to try the case throughout that period.

The roughly three-year pandemic period was treated as neutral. Although ordinary overcrowding generally weighs somewhat against the prosecution, the court viewed the COVID-19 shutdown and resulting backlog as a special circumstance rather than prosecutorial negligence or docket mismanagement. The final ten months did not count against the State: Dubois requested two continuances, and he did not oppose the third, which allowed review of potentially exculpatory cellphone evidence.

Assertion of the right also cut against dismissal. Dubois raised speedy-trial concerns in pro se letters, but counsel did not file a formal motion for approximately three and a half years after the 2019 hearing, despite being on notice. Once the formal motion was filed, trial followed within months. On prejudice, Dubois offered no evidence that the delay impaired a specific defense, witness, or item of proof. His claim of oppressive incarceration was not supported with evidence showing that his confinement prevented him from communicating or assisting counsel. Presumptive prejudice from elapsed time alone was insufficient.

Key Takeaways

  • A six-year delay crosses the threshold for full speedy-trial analysis, but length alone does not establish a constitutional violation.
  • The court treated pandemic shutdowns and their backlog as a neutral, special circumstance, while assigning some responsibility to the State for staffing turnover and delay before 2019.
  • Pro se letters can show an early desire for trial, but a long delay before counsel files a formal motion—and a prompt trial afterward—can weigh against dismissal.

Why It Matters

South Carolina criminal practitioners should build speedy-trial records period by period. The reason for each segment, who requested each continuance, and whether the defense formally pursued relief mattered more here than the aggregate number of years. Counsel should also identify concrete prejudice, such as a lost witness or degraded evidence, because generalized presumptive prejudice will rarely carry the claim by itself.

The opinion has no precedential value under Rule 268(d)(2), SCACR, but it provides a current example of how appellate judges may classify pandemic-era delay. It also warns against allowing an early pro se request to sit without a counseled motion: the court gave substantial weight to the years between appointment of new counsel and the formal request for dismissal.

Trial lawyers should renew the motion when the case is called and ensure the judge rules on every asserted source of prejudice. On appeal, unpreserved theories will not fill gaps in the record made below.

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