Background
In 2015, Governor Lawrence Hogan directed the Maryland Office of the Attorney General (OAG) to investigate and prosecute “crimes of exploitation,” including crimes involving child abuse. Relying on that directive, OAG opened a 2018 criminal investigation into child sexual abuse by clergy and staff of the Archdiocese of Baltimore (AOB), obtaining grand jury subpoenas that compelled AOB to produce hundreds of thousands of records dating back to 1940. No witnesses were called, and no indictments were returned — OAG acknowledged that most alleged perpetrators were dead or beyond the reach of prosecution.
OAG instead drafted a 456-page public report identifying 156 alleged abusers and numerous additional clergy and lay personnel accused of concealing abuse. Because the report was built from grand jury material, OAG moved in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for an order under Maryland Rule 4-642(d) authorizing public release, including the identities of individuals who had never been charged with any crime. Seventeen Petitioners — current and former clergy and staff of AOB and the Archdiocese of Erie, Pennsylvania, none of whom had been charged — objected. The circuit court allowed disclosure, finding a particularized need for public accountability. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed OAG’s authority but vacated and remanded for individualized analysis of each objector.
Petitioners sought certiorari on three common questions: whether the Governor’s directive was constitutionally authorized, whether OAG could publish a report based on secret grand jury material to hold uncharged individuals to public account, and whether public accountability alone satisfies the particularized-need standard for disclosure of grand jury material.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court of Maryland, in an opinion by Justice Biran, upheld OAG’s authority to conduct the investigation but reversed the disclosure order. On the authority question, the Court held that Article V, § 3(a)(2) of the Maryland Constitution expressly permits the Governor to direct OAG to investigate and prosecute a “category” of criminal offenses. “Crimes of exploitation,” including child abuse crimes, qualifies as such a category under the plain meaning of the constitutional text. The directive did not strip State’s Attorneys of any power; § 3(a)(2) contemplates concurrent prosecutorial authority, which raises no constitutional problem because the provision is itself part of the Constitution. Nor did Governor Hogan exercise legislative power — a § 3(a)(2) directive is an executive act.
On the grand jury disclosure question, the Court reversed. Maryland Rule 4-642(d) requires a showing of “particularized need” before a court may order disclosure of grand jury material. The Court held that the public’s interest in learning damaging information about uncharged individuals — standing alone — does not constitute a particularized need. One of the core purposes of grand jury secrecy is to shield uncharged persons from public disgrace in the absence of a criminal charge and a forum for vindication. To overcome an objection by an uncharged individual, a requestor must demonstrate that disclosure will serve an interest beyond the general public interest in the information itself. OAG’s stated purpose — public accountability — did not clear that bar, and the circuit court should have denied the disclosure motion.
Key Takeaways
- The Governor of Maryland may constitutionally direct the OAG to investigate and prosecute broad categories of crimes under Article V, § 3(a)(2), and such directives create concurrent — not exclusive — prosecutorial authority alongside State’s Attorneys.
- A gubernatorial directive under § 3(a)(2) is an executive, not a legislative, act and does not violate separation of powers.
- Public accountability, without more, is not a “particularized need” sufficient to justify court-ordered disclosure of grand jury material identifying uncharged individuals under Maryland Rule 4-642(d).
- A requestor seeking to unmask uncharged individuals named in grand jury material must show an interest in disclosure that goes beyond the public’s general interest in learning adverse information about those persons.
- Grand jury secrecy protects uncharged individuals from public disgrace precisely because they have no criminal forum in which to seek vindication.
Why It Matters
The decision draws a significant constitutional boundary around the use of grand jury investigations as vehicles for public shaming of uncharged individuals. Prosecutors in Maryland — and other jurisdictions that apply analogous particularized-need standards — cannot satisfy the disclosure threshold simply by invoking public interest or accountability goals, however compelling the underlying misconduct may be. The ruling will affect ongoing and future investigations, including those involving institutions such as churches, schools, or corporations, where grand jury subpoenas surface damaging information about people who are never charged.
At the same time, the Court’s endorsement of broad gubernatorial authority to task the OAG with investigating entire crime categories gives Maryland’s Attorney General a flexible tool for taking on systemic misconduct that crosses local prosecutorial jurisdictions. The two holdings together signal that the OAG may investigate widely but may not weaponize grand jury secrecy exceptions to publish comprehensive “name and shame” reports about uncharged individuals under the guise of public accountability.