Background
In 2021 and 2022, Montgomery County enacted amendments to Chapter 57 of its County Code, significantly expanding its firearm regulations. The amendments expanded the definition of “place of public assembly”—and with it, the County’s existing prohibition on firearm possession within 100 yards of such locations—to add hospitals, community health centers, long-term care facilities, childcare facilities, government buildings, and gatherings of protesters to a list that previously covered only parks, places of worship, schools, libraries, recreational facilities, and multipurpose exhibition facilities. The amendments also stripped permit-holders of an existing exemption from the 100-yard prohibition and added regulations targeting “ghost guns,” including a prohibition on possessing or using ghost guns in the presence of a minor.
Two firearms businesses (Engage Armament LLC and I.C.E. Firearms & Defensive Training LLC) and eight individuals holding or seeking State-issued handgun wear-and-carry permits challenged the amendments in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, arguing the provisions were preempted by State law, were not “local laws” within the meaning of the Maryland Constitution, and effected an unconstitutional taking. The circuit court agreed on all three grounds, granted summary judgment to the challengers, and issued a broad injunction. The Appellate Court of Maryland remanded for further factual findings and analysis, and the Supreme Court of Maryland granted certiorari on both parties’ petitions.
The central legal question was the interplay between the General Assembly’s comprehensive preemption of local firearm regulation under Criminal Law § 4-209(a) and the narrow carve-out in § 4-209(b)(1), which expressly authorizes charter counties to regulate firearms with respect to minors, law enforcement officials, and “within 100 yards of or in a park, church, school, public building, and other place of public assembly.”
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court of Maryland issued a finely differentiated ruling, affirming some portions of the County’s ordinance while striking down others. It held that § 4-209(b)(1) provides genuine express authorization for local firearm regulation in the enumerated contexts, and that this authorization has not been abrogated by any of the State’s preemption statutes. Working through the County’s expanded list of “places of public assembly,” the court upheld the County’s authority to regulate firearms in or within 100 yards of parks, places of worship, schools, libraries, courthouses, legislative assemblies, recreational facilities, multipurpose exhibition facilities, and polling places—finding each either expressly enumerated in the statute or a sufficiently close analogue to a listed location. The court struck down as exceeding the County’s authority the inclusion of hospitals, community health centers, long-term care facilities, childcare facilities, broadly defined government buildings, and gatherings of protesters without regard to where those gatherings occur.
On the “with respect to minors” provisions, the court read the statutory authorization narrowly: it permits local regulation of adult conduct that might reasonably result in minors gaining unsupervised access to firearms, but it does not authorize regulating adult possession merely because a minor happens to be present. The court also rejected the conflict-preemption argument targeting the removal of the permit-holder exemption, holding that the County’s prohibition does not conflict with the State’s handgun permitting scheme simply because the State exempts permit-holders from its own general carry ban. The court rejected the takings claim outright, reasoning that an enjoined and unenforceable law cannot accomplish a permanent taking. Finally, the court held that the circuit court erred in granting relief as to § 57-10, which was never raised in the complaint and cannot be introduced for the first time in a summary judgment memorandum.
The court vacated the Appellate Court’s opinion and remanded with instructions to affirm in part and reverse in part the circuit court’s summary judgment, vacate the existing declaratory judgment and injunction, and remand to the circuit court for entry of new, more targeted relief consistent with the opinion.
Key Takeaways
- Maryland charter counties have express but bounded authority to regulate firearms beyond State preemption; the scope of permissible locations is determined by the statutory text of § 4-209(b)(1)(iii) and direct analogues—not by a county’s independent judgment about which places warrant protection.
- Hospitals, community health centers, long-term care facilities, childcare facilities, broadly defined government buildings, and roving protest gatherings fall outside that authority; parks, schools, places of worship, libraries, courthouses, polling places, recreational facilities, and multipurpose exhibition facilities fall within it.
- The “with respect to minors” exception authorizes rules preventing adults from enabling minors’ unsupervised access to firearms, but does not permit blanket prohibition of adult firearm possession merely because a minor is present.
- Removing the permit-holder exemption from a local carry prohibition does not create a conflict with State law simply because State law grants those permit-holders an exemption from the State’s own ban.
- New claims may not be raised for the first time in a summary judgment brief; the proper mechanism is amendment of the complaint under Maryland Rule 2-341.
Why It Matters
This decision provides the most detailed judicial map yet of how Maryland’s firearm preemption scheme interacts with local home rule authority. By confirming that § 4-209(b)(1) is a genuine grant of local power—not merely a savings clause—while simultaneously imposing strict limits on how far that power extends, the court gives charter counties meaningful but carefully bounded room to regulate firearms around sensitive locations. Counties and municipalities across Maryland now have clear guidance on which expansions of the “place of public assembly” concept will survive legal challenge and which will not.
The ruling also carries practical significance for permit holders and firearms businesses operating in Montgomery County, who will see some of the contested restrictions lifted while others remain. More broadly, the court’s narrow construction of the “with respect to minors” authorization limits a potentially expansive avenue for local gun regulation, and its procedural holding on summary-judgment practice reinforces a fundamental principle of Maryland civil procedure that applies well beyond the firearms context.