Background
A Stanislaus County jury convicted Filemon Garcia Olmos on November 12, 2024, of eight specific sexual offenses against his minor stepdaughter and one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child under age 14. The jury also found true two aggravating factors as to all counts in a bifurcated proceeding. On April 11, 2025, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 85 years to life, consisting of 25 years to life on count 1 and 15 years to life on each of counts 2 through 5. Terms on counts 6 through 9 were imposed but stayed under Penal Code section 654, and the court awarded 829 days of custody credits. Olmos filed a timely notice of appeal on April 16, 2025.
Olmos argued that he could not be convicted of both the specific offenses and continuous sexual abuse because their charging periods overlapped. He requested a remand so the trial court could decide which convictions to reverse, and he also challenged the custody-credit calculation. The People agreed that the convictions could not coexist but asked the appellate court to reverse only the continuous sexual abuse conviction and otherwise leave the sentence intact. They also appeared to agree that the credits had been miscalculated.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal agreed that the convictions violated section 288.5, subdivision (c). That provision bars charging another qualifying sexual offense involving the same victim in the same proceeding unless it occurred outside the continuous-abuse period or was charged in the alternative. Because every specific-offense conviction overlapped with the continuous-abuse period, Olmos could not stand convicted of both sets of offenses.
The court then resolved a dispute over the remedy. Olmos relied on People v. Martinez, which remanded for the trial judge to select the convictions most commensurate with culpability in light of case-specific circumstances. The Court of Appeal instead followed its decision in People v. Patton and People v. Torres, under which the defendant generally remains convicted of the offenses carrying the greater aggregate penalty. The specific convictions produced 85 years to life, while continuous sexual abuse carried at most 16 years. The court reasoned that using section 288.5 to displace the more serious convictions would undermine the statute's protective purpose, so it reversed count 6.
The court modified the sentence directly rather than ordering a full resentencing because the trial court had imposed the maximum possible sentence and no sentencing choices remained to restructure. It separately found that Olmos was entitled to 758 days of actual custody credit plus 113 days under section 2933.1, totaling 871 days. The disposition directed preparation of an amended abstract striking count 6's sentence and reflecting 871 days, directed that a certified copy be sent to relevant authorities, and affirmed the judgment in all other respects.
Key Takeaways
- Section 288.5, subdivision (c), prevents convictions for both continuous sexual abuse and overlapping specific sexual offenses involving the same victim and period.
- The court followed Patton and Torres rather than Martinez and retained the convictions carrying the greater aggregate punishment.
- Reversing the continuous sexual abuse conviction did not require a full resentencing because the maximum sentence had been imposed and no choices remained to restructure.
- The appellate court increased Olmos's presentence custody credits from 829 days to 871 days.
- The amended abstract must strike the count 6 sentence, reflect the corrected credits, and be forwarded to all relevant authorities.
Why It Matters
The opinion applies a remedy-focused approach to overlapping continuous-abuse and specific-offense convictions, explaining why this record warranted appellate reversal of the lesser-punishment conviction rather than a remand for the trial court to choose among convictions. It declines to follow Martinez, emphasizing the greater aggregate penalty and the absence of remaining sentencing choices.
The judgment otherwise remains intact, including the 85-years-to-life aggregate term on the specific offenses. The practical changes are the reversal of count 6 and correction of the custody-credit award through an amended abstract of judgment.