Background
Michael DeShawn Harris was sentenced in 2014 to a 15-year prison term after convictions in Riverside County for first degree burglary with a person present who was not an accomplice, infliction of corporal injury on a spouse, and first degree robbery. The trial court also imposed but struck a one-year sentence for a prison prior enhancement under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). Harris later appeared on a California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation list identifying Riverside County persons considered potentially eligible for relief under section 1172.75 because of a prison prior. At a December 2023 hearing, the sentencing court denied his request for a full resentencing hearing for the reasons articulated in the court's case number RIF1605083, which the opinion's footnote identifies as People v. Archuleta.
This was Harris's second appeal. In the first, the Court of Appeal followed its then-controlling decision in People v. Rhodius and held that section 1172.75 required a qualifying prison prior to be imposed and executed, so it affirmed the denial of relief because the punishment for Harris's prison prior had been stricken rather than executed. The California Supreme Court granted review, initially held the case pending People v. Rhodius, then deferred it pending People v. Espino. After deciding Espino, the Supreme Court transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate the earlier opinion and reconsider the cause in light of that decision. The court vacated Harris I, invited supplemental briefing, and both parties argued that Harris was entitled to a full resentencing hearing.
The Court’s Holding
The court explained the statutory backdrop. In 2019 the Legislature amended section 667.5, subdivision (b) to eliminate prior prison term enhancements unless the prior term was for specified sexually violent offenses, retroactive to cases not final on January 1, 2020. Section 1172.75, effective in 2022, declared legally invalid qualifying prison priors imposed before that date and directed CDCR to identify potentially eligible persons and provide their information to sentencing courts. A dispute arose over whether the word 'imposed' limited relief to enhancements that were imposed and executed, or also covered sentences that were imposed but stricken. People v. Espino resolved that question, holding that a sentence is 'imposed' for section 1172.75 purposes even when the sentencing court struck the punishment for the prison prior enhancement.
Applying Espino, the court concluded that Harris's sentence included a qualifying prison prior that was imposed and stricken, entitling him to a resentencing hearing under section 1172.75, subdivision (d). Both parties agreed he was entitled to that hearing. The court therefore reversed the trial court's finding that Harris was ineligible for resentencing and remanded with instructions to strike the section 667.5, subdivision (b) prison prior enhancement in its entirety and to hold a resentencing hearing under subdivision (d). The court expressly stated that it voiced no opinion on whether Harris would be entitled to any additional relief at the resentencing hearing.
Key Takeaways
- A qualifying prison prior enhancement counts as 'imposed' under section 1172.75 even when the sentencing court struck its punishment, per People v. Espino.
- After the Supreme Court's Espino decision and transfer order, the Court of Appeal vacated its earlier opinion in Harris I and reversed the trial court's ineligibility finding.
- The remand requires the trial court to strike Harris's section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement in its entirety and hold a full resentencing hearing under section 1172.75, subdivision (d).
- The appellate court expressly declined to decide whether Harris would receive any additional relief at the resentencing hearing.
Why It Matters
This decision applies Espino's controlling construction of section 1172.75 to a prisoner whose enhancement was imposed but stricken, displacing the narrower imposed-and-executed interpretation the court had applied in Harris's first appeal. It illustrates how the statutory CDCR identification process, combined with Supreme Court review and transfer, can restore a resentencing opportunity after an initial denial.
The remand secures a full hearing and removal of the qualifying enhancement, but it does not predetermine Harris's ultimate sentence. Any further relief remains for the sentencing court to resolve through the section 1172.75, subdivision (d) process, a question the Court of Appeal expressly left open.