Background
In September 2024, the State charged Trista Reynolds with domestic violence, a class B misdemeanor, in Burleigh County, North Dakota. Reynolds moved for a fitness-to-proceed evaluation, which the district court granted, ordering North Dakota State Hospital (NDSH) staff to conduct the assessment. Reynolds simultaneously faced felony and misdemeanor charges in two other cases.
The evaluation process stalled for months because Reynolds repeatedly authorized the release of her medical records to NDSH and then retracted that authorization. At a February 2025 hearing—which Reynolds failed to attend—the district court expressed frustration that neither party had sought a subpoena or warrant to obtain the necessary records, and ultimately issued a bench warrant ordering Reynolds held until the evaluation was completed. An NDSH report finding Reynolds fit to proceed was filed on March 31, 2025.
After several continuances and a substitution of defense counsel, a jury found Reynolds guilty on September 24, 2025. The court sentenced her to 30 days of incarceration, with credit for 30 days already served. Reynolds appealed, arguing for the first time on appeal that the district court should have dismissed the case due to the lengthy delay in bringing her to trial.
The Court’s Holding
The North Dakota Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the conviction. Reviewing Reynolds’s unpreserved claims under the plain-error standard, the court held that no obvious error occurred. On the statutory claim under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-08(2), the court held that the dismissal deadline the statute imposes is triggered only when a court actually finds a defendant lacks fitness to proceed. Because the district court never made that finding—the fitness evaluation was still pending when Reynolds was ultimately found fit—the dismissal clock never started running.
On the claim under N.D.R.Crim.P. 48, which permits discretionary dismissal for unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the court held Reynolds failed to satisfy the obvious-error standard on two independent grounds. First, she identified no precedent applying Rule 48 to comparable circumstances, meaning there was no clearly established legal rule whose violation she could demonstrate. Second, she made no showing that the delay affected the outcome of her case, a requirement for plain error to implicate her substantial rights.
Key Takeaways
- The N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-08(2) dismissal deadline for fitness-to-proceed suspensions is a conditional trigger: it requires an actual judicial finding that the defendant lacks fitness to proceed before the clock begins. Delay in completing an evaluation, without such a finding, does not activate the statute.
- A defendant raising a Rule 48 dismissal argument for the first time on appeal must identify a clearly established legal rule and demonstrate that the delay prejudiced the outcome—generalized assertions of delay are insufficient under plain-error review.
- Reynolds’s own repeated revocation of her medical-records authorization contributed substantially to the evaluation delay, undermining any claim that the delay was attributable to government inaction.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the precise point at which North Dakota’s statutory fitness-to-proceed dismissal mechanism activates, a question with practical consequences for cases where evaluations are delayed before any formal finding of unfitness is made. Defense counsel and prosecutors should understand that the mere pendency of a fitness evaluation—even a prolonged one—does not automatically implicate the dismissal deadlines of § 12.1-04-08(2).
The case also reinforces how difficult it is to obtain relief under plain-error review for procedural claims that were never raised below. Attorneys in North Dakota criminal cases who believe a statutory or rule-based dismissal deadline has been violated must raise that argument in the district court to preserve it; waiting until appeal and invoking obvious-error review is a narrow path that requires both a clear rule violation and demonstrable prejudice.