Background
On April 2, 2021, Ladarrius Hodge was a front-seat passenger in a vehicle stopped by Shreveport police for traffic violations. Officers smelled burnt marijuana and discovered a loaded 9mm Hi-Point pistol with an extended magazine in a backpack between Hodge’s feet. The driver, Sonique Kennon, initially claimed ownership of the firearm but later admitted she had reported it stolen and subsequently gave it to Hodge. Hodge had a prior felony conviction from December 2019 for unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling — a reduced charge stemming from a home invasion and battery of a dating partner — for which he received probation.
Hodge was charged under La. R.S. 14:95.1 with possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a convicted felon. He attended the first day of his April 2023 jury trial but failed to appear for the remaining proceedings without explanation. The jury convicted him in absentia after deliberating less than one hour. At sentencing in September 2023, the trial court imposed 18 years at hard labor without benefits.
On original appeal, this court rejected Hodge’s sufficiency-of-evidence challenge but vacated the sentence because the trial court had failed to observe the mandatory 24-hour sentencing delay under La. C. Cr. P. art. 873. The case was remanded for resentencing. At resentencing in February 2025, the district court reimposed the same 18-year sentence, expressly noting Hodge’s mid-trial flight as a significant aggravating factor alongside his rehabilitation efforts.
The Court’s Holding
The Second Circuit affirmed the reimposed 18-year sentence, finding adequate compliance with the sentencing guidelines of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 and no constitutional excessiveness. Although the trial court’s on-the-record recitation was minimal, the court held that the parties’ sentencing memoranda — which detailed Hodge’s criminal history, his deliberate evasion of law enforcement after being arrested on a bench warrant, and his personal circumstances — provided sufficient factual support for the sentence chosen. The court found the record as a whole clearly illuminated the sentencing choice even where the formal recitation fell short.
On the constitutional excessiveness claim, the court acknowledged that 18 years — within the statutory range of 5 to 20 years under La. R.S. 14:95.1(B)(1) — was on the higher end compared to recent comparable cases in which the firearm was not discharged. Nevertheless, the court identified several aggravating factors supporting the sentence: Hodge’s deliberate flight from his own trial and subsequent evasion of arrest, the extended magazine on the pistol, the presence of young children in the vehicle, and evidence of marijuana use in the car. The court perceived no manifest abuse of the trial court’s broad sentencing discretion.
On its own motion, the court noted a procedural defect: the trial court had failed to advise Hodge of the specific two-year prescriptive period for seeking post-conviction relief as required by La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.8(D). The appellate court cured this omission through its opinion, formally notifying Hodge that no application for post-conviction relief will be considered if filed more than two years after his judgment of conviction and sentence becomes final.
Key Takeaways
- A defendant’s flight from trial mid-proceedings is a legitimate aggravating factor a sentencing court may weigh, even if the flight does not directly relate to the gravity of the underlying offense.
- Minimal on-the-record Art. 894.1 compliance may be cured where the parties’ sentencing memoranda, relied upon by the court, provide an adequate factual basis for the sentence — provided those memoranda are not objected to.
- An 18-year sentence for felon-in-possession (out of a 5–20 year statutory range) is not constitutionally excessive where aggravating circumstances include an extended-capacity magazine, children in the vehicle, and deliberate evasion of justice.
- When a trial court fails to advise a defendant of the two-year PCR prescriptive period under La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.8(D), an appellate court may remedy the error sua sponte through its opinion rather than remanding for re-advisement.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces Louisiana appellate courts’ deference to trial court sentencing discretion in felon-in-possession cases, particularly where a defendant’s conduct — including flight from trial — reflects a broader disregard for the justice system. Defense practitioners should note that mid-trial absconding can materially influence sentencing outcomes even when the underlying offense did not involve violence or the actual discharge of a weapon.
The case also offers a practical reminder about post-conviction relief advisements. The court’s sua sponte correction — notifying the defendant of the PCR deadline through the appellate opinion itself rather than remanding — illustrates an efficient remedy for a recurring procedural oversight, and signals that such advisement errors alone will not result in resentencing on remand.