Background
X.G. appealed a postjudgment restitution order requiring him to pay the victim's entire claimed loss despite other participants in the underlying incident. An amended juvenile wardship petition alleged robbery, felony child endangerment, handgun possession, and grand theft, together with firearm-use allegations. X.G. ultimately pled no contest to grand theft, and the remaining charges were dismissed. After his probation was terminated as unsuccessful, the juvenile court held a disposition and restitution hearing.
X.G. argued that the 2025 amendment to Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 required liability to reflect his percentage of responsibility, particularly because two adults were named in an arrest warrant. The prosecution maintained that he was the only person found to have committed the crime and that full restitution was required. The juvenile court ordered the full amount, reasoning that victim redress was the purpose of restitution and that it did not have the ability to apportion because there were no other defendants among whom the amount of restitution could be apportioned.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal rejected the parties' shared position that "co-offender" includes unadjudicated participants. It construed that term to mean another minor adjudicated a ward of the court, relying on the ordinary understanding of an offender, section 730.6's limitation of restitution orders to adjudicated wards, and legislative history describing an end to joint and several liability for youth codefendants. It also distinguished Civil Code section 1431.2 because that civil damages scheme serves different purposes and lacks the same constitutional restitution foundation.
The court nevertheless held that section 730.6 requires a juvenile court to consider whether compelling and extraordinary reasons justify less than full restitution. Relevant circumstances can include other participants being tried separately, the minor's role, and the minor's contribution to the losses. Because the juvenile court believed it lacked authority to apportion and never considered that exception, it failed to exercise informed discretion. The restitution order was reversed and remanded for the juvenile court to decide the amount in the first instance, without predetermining a reduction.
In its October 26, 2026 order, the court replaced the original sentence "Four individuals exited the stopped vehicle, three of whom had firearms." with "Three of four individuals exited the stopped vehicle and had firearms." It also added a footnote addressing Division Five's September 29, 2026 decision in In re J.G., which concerned apportionment under section 730.6, subdivision (b)(3). After reviewing that decision and X.G.'s rehearing request, the court found no additional issue that he lacked an opportunity to brief and argue, declined to grant rehearing or reconsider its holding, denied rehearing, and expressly left the judgment unchanged.
Key Takeaways
- Section 730.6's co-offender apportionment provision applies to minors adjudicated wards of the juvenile court, not automatically to every unadjudicated participant in an offense.
- Even when only one minor has been adjudicated, the juvenile court must consider whether compelling and extraordinary reasons support departing from full restitution.
- Other participants' involvement, separate proceedings, the minor's role, and responsibility for the losses may inform that discretionary assessment.
- The appellate court remanded for the juvenile court to exercise its discretion rather than deciding itself that X.G. deserved a reduced award.
- The October 26, 2026 modification replaced the original factual sentence with a corrected sentence and addressed In re J.G., but denied rehearing and made no change to the judgment.
Why It Matters
The opinion separates two questions that the parties' proposed interpretation would have combined: who qualifies as a juvenile co-offender for statutory apportionment, and when an individual minor's circumstances justify less than full restitution. Its reading preserves full restitution as the general rule while requiring an on-the-record consideration of the statutory exception.
The decision also explains why a reduced award does not conflict with the Victims' Bill of Rights: the constitutional provision establishes a general restitution right, while implementing statutes supply the full-restitution requirements and may be amended. The rehearing order leaves that analysis intact while acknowledging a related appellate decision without adopting or resolving a different analysis here.