Background
Emad Moawad, a dentist, was charged with 22 counts involving six victims for sexual misconduct against female patients and an intern while he performed dental work. The charges included sexual penetration by use of force (Penal Code § 289, subd. (a)(1)), sexual battery by restraint and sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd. (a)), and a lewd act upon a child age 14 or 15 (§ 288, subd. (c)(1)). The opinion describes him fondling patients' breasts, placing his fingers in their vaginas, rubbing his genitals on their faces, necks, and shoulders, and forcing an intern's hand onto his genitals while holding his foot against her chair. After a news report covered one victim's assault, others came forward.
The first jury deadlocked, resulting in a mistrial, and several counts were dismissed for lack of a speedy trial. A second jury convicted Moawad of five counts of sexual penetration by use of force, six counts of sexual battery by restraint, and one count of sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to a total of 75 years to life. On appeal from the Los Angeles County Superior Court judgment, he raised two related claims: that the trial court erred in admitting a psychology expert's testimony on sexual assault trauma, and that the jury received internally inconsistent instructions on how to consider that testimony.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in admitting the expert's testimony. The psychologist testified as a 'blind expert' who knew none of the facts or details of the case and explained counterintuitive victim behaviors, particularly in cases involving a known offender or a person the victim trusts. The court rejected Moawad's argument that the testimony was unnecessary because sexual assault is prevalent, citing People v. McAlpin: expert testimony is excluded only when it adds nothing at all to the jury's common fund of knowledge. The testimony played precisely the role People v. Bledsoe approved—disabusing jurors of widely held misconceptions about sexual assault victims—and was properly employed to neutralize apparently self-impeaching behavior, because defense counsel emphasized delayed reporting and some victims' return to Moawad's office for treatment.
The court also held that the jury was correctly instructed. The instruction told jurors that sexual assault trauma syndrome testimony was not evidence that Moawad committed any charged crime, but could be considered only in deciding whether a victim's conduct was consistent with that of someone sexually assaulted and in evaluating the alleged victim's believability. Reviewing the instructional claim de novo, the court disagreed that this was internally inconsistent with the no-proof-of-guilt language: the credibility purpose is inevitably connected to the victim's testimony but does not permit an improper use, and appellate courts have repeatedly rejected that argument. Because the expert was blind to the case facts, no reasonable juror could have understood the instruction to allow an improper purpose. Although Moawad forfeited both claims by failing to raise them below, the court exercised its discretion to address the merits and affirmed the judgment.
Key Takeaways
- Expert testimony on sexual assault trauma syndrome is admissible to explain counterintuitive victim behavior, such as delayed reporting or returning to the perpetrator, even when the offender is known or trusted.
- A blind expert who knows none of the case facts may help the jury evaluate victim credibility without opining on whether an assault occurred.
- Instructions limiting trauma-syndrome testimony to assessing whether a victim's conduct was consistent with sexual assault and to evaluating believability are not internally inconsistent with instructions that the testimony is not evidence of guilt.
- Evidentiary and instructional claims not raised in the trial court are forfeited, but appellate courts may exercise discretion to reach the merits to forestall ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.
Why It Matters
This unpublished decision reaffirms established California law that expert testimony on sexual assault trauma syndrome serves a limited but important role: it helps juries understand counterintuitive victim behavior, particularly in cases involving known offenders or trusted individuals, and may be considered in evaluating credibility without serving as proof that the defendant committed the crime.
The opinion also confirms that limiting instructions tying the testimony to victim conduct and believability are not internally inconsistent, and the court's willingness to decide forfeited claims on the merits offers practical guidance for trial courts admitting such testimony and drafting instructions in sexual assault prosecutions.