People v. Wilson — Convictions for Torture and Sexual Assault of a Child Affirmed, but Sentence Vacated Because Trial Court Relied on an Aggravating Factor the Jury Never Found

Case
People v. Wilson
Court
3rd District Court of Appeal
Judge
Mesiwala; Hull; Mauro
Date Decided
2026-10-29
Docket No.
C099458
Status
Unreported / Non-Citable
Topics
criminal law, torture, sexual assault of a child, Evidence Code section 1108, Evidence Code section 1109, prior acts evidence, domestic violence expert testimony, limiting instructions, forensic interview, Evidence Code section 356, substantial evidence, specific intent, upper term sentencing, aggravating factors, jury trial rights, Cunningham v. California, People v. Wiley, harmless error, ineffective assistance of counsel
Source
Mirrored from lexcalifornia.com

Background

Jeremy Wilson was charged with six crimes arising from an attack on his girlfriend's two-year-old son: torture, sexual penetration with force, assault with intent to commit a sexual offense, aggravated sexual assault of a child via penetration, sexual penetration of a child aged 10 or younger, and child abuse likely to cause great bodily injury. The prosecution also alleged great bodily injury enhancements and three one-strike special allegations. Over 14 days, the jury heard from 26 witnesses, including the child's mother and Wilson's ex-girlfriend, both of whom testified about his prior acts of sexual abuse and domestic violence. The jury also watched one of the child's forensic interviews and heard from a domestic violence expert.

The jury found Wilson guilty on all counts and found all special allegations true, then found four aggravating factors true in a separate proceeding. At sentencing, the trial court additionally found that Wilson's prior record showed convictions of increasing seriousness, citing a single 2012 misdemeanor DUI. The court sentenced Wilson to life without possibility of parole on the forcible penetration count plus a consecutive life term on the torture count, and imposed and stayed various upper terms and enhancements. Wilson appealed, challenging the admission of prior acts evidence and the forensic interview, the exclusion of inconsistent family court statements, the lack of a limiting instruction on the domestic violence expert, the sufficiency of torture intent, and multiple aspects of his sentence.

The Court’s Holding

The Court of Appeal rejected all four challenges to the convictions. It found no abuse of discretion in admitting uncharged sexual abuse and domestic violence acts under Evidence Code sections 1108 and 1109, reasoning that the prior acts tended to show Wilson enjoyed exerting power over people close to him and that dissimilarity arguments did not negate probative value. The court declined to follow People v. Housley's rule requiring a sua sponte limiting instruction on domestic violence expert testimony, agreeing instead with People v. Mateo that such an instruction must be specifically requested, and found no ineffective assistance because counsel could rationally avoid highlighting the expert's testimony. It also held that any error in excluding the girlfriend's family court statements was harmless given other credibility evidence and the strength of the prosecution's case, and that the forensic interview was properly admitted under Evidence Code section 356 after defense counsel opened the door on cross-examination.

On the torture conviction, the court found substantial evidence of specific intent to cause cruel and extreme pain for a sadistic purpose, pointing to the extensive bruising and bite wounds, evidence the child was drugged, and the systematic nature of the attack. However, the court accepted the People's concession that the trial court erred under Cunningham v. California and People v. Wiley by relying on the increasing-seriousness aggravating factor, which the jury never found true, to select upper term sentences. Because a rational juror could have reached a different conclusion on that comparative and qualitative factor given Wilson's single prior misdemeanor, the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for full resentencing, mooting Wilson's other sentencing claims, and otherwise affirmed the judgment.

Key Takeaways

  • Prior acts of sexual abuse and domestic violence against adult partners can be admissible to show propensity in a trial for abusing a child, because many offenders are not specialists and differences in victims or circumstances reduce but do not eliminate probative value.
  • A trial court has no sua sponte duty to give a limiting instruction on domestic violence expert testimony; the Third District expressly joined People v. Mateo in rejecting People v. Housley's contrary rule.
  • Defense counsel's cross-examination of a detective about a child's forensic interview can open the door to admission of the interview video under Evidence Code section 356 to provide context, and failure to object to testimony as nonresponsive forfeits the claim.
  • Torture does not require permanent injuries; extensive bruising, bite wounds, and evidence a victim was drugged can support an inference of sadistic intent even when injuries later resolve.
  • Under People v. Wiley, a trial court cannot rely on an increasing-seriousness aggravating factor the jury did not find true to impose upper terms, and such error requires resentencing when a rational juror could have concluded otherwise.

Why It Matters

The decision reinforces that California's propensity evidence statutes reach broadly across victim types, and it deepens an appellate split by siding with Mateo against Housley on limiting instructions for domestic violence experts. It also provides a clean application of the California Supreme Court's then-recent Wiley decision, illustrating that even a defendant with a minimal record can obtain full resentencing when a trial court finds an increasing-seriousness factor without submitting it to the jury. The harmless-error analysis on the excluded family court statements further shows how overwhelming independent evidence of guilt can insulate a verdict from impeachment-based challenges.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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