Background
A 2011 jury convicted Fernando Valdez of second degree murder and found true that a principal was armed with a firearm. It acquitted him of first degree murder and found the lying-in-wait special circumstance not true. Codefendant Jeremy Delphin was convicted of first degree murder, with true findings that he personally discharged a firearm causing death and committed the murder by lying in wait. Valdez received 15 years to life plus one year for the firearm enhancement, and another appellate panel affirmed his judgment on direct appeal.
The opinion recounts the earlier trial evidence only as background and expressly does not use that factual summary in its analysis. According to that summary, Delphin believed he had been shortchanged in a marijuana purchase, fought with the victim's son, and later loaded two shotguns into Valdez's car. Valdez rang the victim's doorbell and spoke with her before Delphin came around the garage and fatally shot her.
In 2023, Valdez filed his second petition under Penal Code section 1172.6, alleging the statutory requirements for resentencing following changes to the murder laws. The prosecution argued that he had directly aided and abetted murder rather than been convicted through imputed malice. The trial court denied the petition at the prima facie stage, describing Valdez as a direct aider and abettor acting with express malice and relying extensively on the prior appellate opinion's discussion of the evidence.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal first held that the trial court used impermissible methods at the prima facie stage. A court may consult the record of conviction, but it cannot consider the factual summary of a prior appellate opinion at any stage of the section 1172.6 petition process, weigh evidence, make credibility determinations, or deny relief unless the petition and record conclusively establish ineligibility. Here, the trial court paraphrased and quoted the earlier appellate findings. Its later assertion that it also relied on trial transcripts was unsupported by transcript citations, and its language resembled substantial-evidence review rather than the limited statutory inquiry.
The court independently concluded that instructional ambiguity established Valdez's prima facie entitlement to further proceedings. The jury received instructions on express and implied malice, aiding and abetting, and lying-in-wait murder comparable to those addressed in People v. Maldonado. Those instructions did not necessarily require Valdez to know that Delphin intended to kill or personally to know of and consciously disregard the risk of death. The court explained that the ambiguity applied whether the prosecution's theory concerned lying-in-wait murder or direct aiding and abetting of second degree murder, so the jury could have convicted Valdez by imputing malice based solely on his participation.
The court rejected the prosecution's request to apply the reasonable-likelihood test used for instructional error on direct appeal. It reasoned that weighing factual characterizations to assess how the jury probably understood the instructions conflicts with the conclusive-ineligibility standard governing prima facie review, while adding that the test would be satisfied in any event. The denial was reversed with directions to issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing. The court did not decide Valdez's issue-preclusion, harmless-error, or remaining due-process arguments.
Key Takeaways
- A section 1172.6 court cannot consider a prior appellate opinion's factual summary at any stage of the petition process.
- Ambiguous aiding-and-abetting and murder instructions can establish a prima facie case when they permit malice to be imputed solely from participation in a crime.
- A second degree murder conviction did not eliminate the instructional-ambiguity problem identified in Maldonado and Langi.
- The court declined to layer the direct-appeal reasonable-likelihood test onto the statute's conclusive-ineligibility standard.
- The remand requires an order to show cause and evidentiary hearing, not an immediate reduction of Valdez's conviction or sentence.
Why It Matters
The decision separates preliminary eligibility screening from the factfinding that may occur at an evidentiary hearing. It also explains that a petitioner need not have raised instructional ambiguity on direct appeal, following the California Supreme Court's rejection of that procedural bar in People v. Lopez.
For similarly instructed juries, the opinion treats possible imputed-malice pathways as sufficient to advance a facially valid petition unless the record conclusively negates them. It leaves the ultimate resentencing determination and Valdez's additional appellate contentions unresolved.