Background
A jury convicted Safoloooi Sam Taito of first degree murder and second degree robbery, found true a felony-murder special circumstance and personal use of a deadly and dangerous weapon, and acquitted him of residential burglary. The prosecution arose from the fatal beating and stabbing of Librado Godoy Lopez during an incident involving Taito and codefendant Itiitilogoma "Kiki" Su'e. Taito received life without parole for the special-circumstance murder, plus a robbery sentence; the jury had deadlocked on whether to impose death, and the prosecution later stopped seeking that penalty. His conviction was affirmed in 1997.
Taito petitioned for resentencing in 2021 under former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6. The superior court denied the petition at the prima facie stage without issuing an order to show cause. The Court of Appeal initially affirmed, reasoning that the special-circumstance finding established culpability under section 189, subdivision (e)(2). After granting review, the California Supreme Court transferred the matter back with directions to vacate that decision and reconsider it under People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671.
The Court’s Holding
The court explained that Morris requires a non-killer liable under section 189, subdivision (e)(2) to have acted with intent to kill and aided, abetted, or assisted the actual killer in the killing itself, not merely in the underlying felony. The edited CALJIC No. 8.80.1 instruction permitted a special-circumstance finding based on assistance in "any acts during the commission of the murder." Consequently, the jury's finding did not necessarily establish the assistance in the lethal act that Morris requires.
The court also rejected the Attorney General's argument that the conviction necessarily rested on Taito being the actual killer. Defense counsel's concession and the prosecution's stabbing theory did not bind the jury, which also received aiding-and-abetting instructions. Although the weapon-use finding established personal use of the screwdriver, determining that Taito alone inflicted a lethal stab wound would require crediting testimony, identifying the object witnesses saw, and resolving the respective conduct of Taito and Su'e. Those steps would constitute impermissible factfinding at the prima facie stage.
The court therefore reversed the superior court's order denying the petition and remanded with directions to issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). It did not vacate the murder conviction or decide that Taito ultimately merits resentencing. It expressly acknowledged that he might prove to be the actual killer or liable under another still-valid felony-murder theory, but those questions could not be resolved conclusively from the record of conviction.
Key Takeaways
- A felony-murder special-circumstance finding based on assistance in any acts during the murder does not necessarily establish the killing-specific assistance required by Morris.
- Arguments or concessions by trial counsel do not establish what the jury necessarily decided when alternative liability theories were available.
- A personal weapon-use finding does not automatically establish actual-killer status when its relationship to the lethal act remains dependent on factual assessments.
- The prima facie inquiry asks whether the record conclusively establishes ineligibility, not whether the petitioner might ultimately be found culpable after a hearing.
- The remand requires an order to show cause and evidentiary hearing but does not itself grant resentencing or vacate Taito's conviction.
Why It Matters
The decision applies Morris to an older record containing both a special-circumstance finding and evidence that the petitioner personally stabbed the victim. It demonstrates that even strong evidence of direct participation cannot substitute for findings necessarily made by the jury when appellate resolution would require weighing testimony or drawing disputed factual inferences.
For section 1172.6 proceedings, the opinion separates threshold eligibility from ultimate culpability. Trial courts must examine the instructions and unavoidable jury findings rather than treating prosecution theories, defense concessions, or weapon enhancements as conclusive substitutes for the elements required by current felony-murder law.