Background
On April 3, 2021, John J. Dahmer raced another vehicle through downtown Denver, ran a red light, and collided with a third vehicle, killing the driver. The struck vehicle then hit pedestrians before rolling into a building. Blood draws taken over three hours showed Dahmer’s blood alcohol content at 0.16, 0.142, and 0.12. Nine days later, the prosecution filed charges in Denver County Court, and Dahmer requested a preliminary hearing scheduled for August 3, 2021. Four days before that hearing, the prosecution filed a direct information in Denver District Court adding first degree murder and attempted first degree murder counts. The county court set the case for paper review, and the prosecution moved to dismiss the county court case after the district court advisement.
Dahmer requested a good cause hearing regarding the dismissal and refiling, which the district court held, finding good cause. He pleaded not guilty on December 17, 2021, with a speedy trial deadline of June 17, 2022. At a pretrial conference, defense counsel requested a continuance because transcripts from a motions hearing could not be prepared in time, though Dahmer expressly stated he did not want to waive speedy trial rights. The district court found a waiver and reset trial for September 2022. After counsel withdrew due to a conflict and new counsel obtained several continuances, trial occurred on January 22, 2024. The jury found Dahmer guilty of reckless manslaughter, attempt to commit reckless manslaughter, vehicular homicide (under the influence), vehicular assault (under the influence), speed contest, and careless driving. The district court adjudicated him a habitual criminal and sentenced him to sixty years in the Department of Corrections.
The Court’s Holding
The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and sentence. Regarding statutory speedy trial rights under section 18-1-405, C.R.S. 2026, the court held that defense counsel may request a continuance without the defendant’s personal consent, and such a request extends the speedy trial deadline by six months. Relying on People v. Fleming, 900 P.2d 19 (Colo. 1995), and People v. Duncan, 31 P.3d 874 (Colo. 2001), the court explained that the decision to continue trial belonged to counsel, not Dahmer, and the continuance was properly charged to the defense.
On constitutional speedy trial grounds, the court applied the four-factor Barker v. Wingo test. While the nearly three-year delay was presumptively prejudicial, the court found the delay attributable to defense continuances for preparation and witness accommodation. Dahmer asserted his right through objections and pro se motions, but also requested continuances, rendering that factor neutral. Regarding prejudice, the court concluded Dahmer failed to demonstrate material prejudice beyond that experienced by the average incarcerated defendant, and he did not show how the delay impaired his defense.
The court rejected Dahmer’s argument that the prosecution lost its right to prosecute by not presenting probable cause evidence at the county court preliminary hearing. The court noted the county court never actually held a preliminary hearing; instead, the case was dismissed before any probable cause findings, and the prosecution properly refiled by direct information in district court under Crim. P. 5(a)(4)(VII) and 7(c)(4). The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding good cause for refiling, as the prosecution presented evidence that critical details—vehicle speed, blood alcohol level, and the red light violation—were discovered after the initial filing.
Regarding habitual criminal sentencing under section 18-1.3-801(2)(a)(I), the court agreed the district court erred by not submitting to a jury whether prior convictions arose from separate and distinct criminal episodes, as required by Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), and People v. Gregg, 2025 CO 57. However, applying constitutional harmless error review, the court found the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the record conclusively established six prior convictions from separate episodes with different dates, locations, and victims, supported by certified court files, fingerprints, and photographs. The court also rejected Dahmer’s argument that prior convictions must result from trials rather than guilty pleas, and declined to reach his equal protection and due process challenges because they were unpreserved and not plainly erroneous.
Key Takeaways
- Defense counsel may request a continuance without the defendant’s personal consent, and such a request extends the statutory speedy trial deadline by six months under Colorado law.
- A nearly three-year delay is presumptively prejudicial under Barker v. Wingo, but delays attributable to defense continuances for preparation and witness accommodation weigh against finding a constitutional violation.
- When a county court case is dismissed before a preliminary hearing occurs, the prosecution may refile by direct information in district court with a showing of good cause under Crim. P. 7(c)(4).
- Under Erlinger and Gregg, a jury must determine whether prior convictions arose from separate criminal episodes for habitual criminal adjudication, but judicial adjudication is harmless error when the record conclusively establishes separate episodes through certified documentation.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that statutory speedy trial rights may be waived by counsel without the defendant’s personal approval, aligning Colorado practice with the principle that tactical decisions about continuances belong to attorneys. It also clarifies that constitutional speedy trial claims require a showing of material prejudice beyond ordinary incarceration anxiety, particularly when defense-requested continuances caused the delay.
The opinion provides significant guidance on habitual criminal sentencing following Erlinger, demonstrating that even when a jury trial error occurs on the “separate episodes” element, appellate courts will find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when the prosecution presents overwhelming documentary evidence—including certified court files, fingerprints, and photographs—establishing that prior convictions were distinct in time, location, and victim.