Background
Denver Human Services received two referrals arising from incidents in late 2024 and early 2025 that led to criminal child-abuse charges against the mother. DHS petitioned to have her two children adjudicated dependent and neglected, alleging that excessive alcohol use caused her rapidly escalating emotional behavior. The mother denied the allegations.
After four continuances, the juvenile court convened the adjudicatory hearing. Four days earlier, the mother’s appointed attorney had sought to withdraw because of an actual conflict. The mother appeared on the trial date but resisted attending a separate hearing on counsel’s motion, declared “y’all are fired,” and left before either hearing proceeded. Despite extensive efforts by court staff, the parties, and sheriffs to locate her and encourage her participation, she did not return. The court allowed counsel to withdraw and adjudicated the children dependent and neglected in the mother’s absence.
The Court’s Holding
The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the mother expressly and implicitly waived her statutory right to counsel. Her statement that counsel was fired supported express waiver, while her pattern of refusing to cooperate with appointed counsel and deliberately absenting herself when representation was at issue constituted conduct inconsistent with asserting the right. Her due-process argument merely duplicated the rejected right-to-counsel claim.
The division also rejected the mother’s argument that the adjudicatory hearing should have been continued because no party requested a continuance. In any event, the case was governed by expedited permanency-planning requirements, the hearing occurred 245 days into the case after four prior continuances, and the juvenile court found that proceeding was in the children’s best interests.
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by denying the mother’s oral request for relief under Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). She presented no new matter of fact or law extrinsic to the judgment and could not use Rule 60 as a substitute for an appeal. The division declined to address undeveloped and unpreserved claims concerning a possible brain injury or disability and found no reason to know that the children were Indian children based solely on an assertion of Blackfoot heritage.
Key Takeaways
- A parent may waive the statutory right to counsel in a dependency-and-neglect case through an express statement or conduct inconsistent with asserting that right.
- A court does not err by failing to grant a continuance that no party requested, particularly in an expedited-permanency case after repeated delays and a supported best-inter interests finding.
- Rule 60(b) relief requires an appropriate ground based on new matter extrinsic to the judgment; it cannot serve as a substitute for a direct appeal.
Why It Matters
The unpublished decision illustrates that a parent’s noncooperation and deliberate absence can amount to waiver of counsel even when the adjudicatory hearing proceeds without the parent. It also underscores the importance of making concrete requests, developing disability-related arguments, and supplying supporting documentation in the juvenile court.
For dependency practitioners, the opinion highlights the weight courts give to children’s need for timely permanency after multiple continuances. Assertions of possible tribal heritage, disability, or procedural unfairness must be supported and preserved to obtain meaningful appellate review.