Background
Carnel Davis was convicted of second degree murder, felony menacing, robbery, and harassment following a shooting outside a nightclub in Colorado Springs. The facts were highly disputed. Davis claimed he took his ex-partner Shanee Wells’s phone as a joke, and when she tried to retrieve it outside the club, he tried to separate them but she fell. Wells and her friends testified Davis knocked her down, placed her in a chokehold, pulled a gun, held it to her head, and tried to shoot before the gun jammed.
When three men, including the victim, confronted Davis, he allegedly picked up a gun that fell from one man’s pocket, pointed it at the group, and told them to “get the fuck out of my face.” The victim then approached the car Davis was in, and Davis fired multiple shots, fatally wounding him in the chest. Davis turned himself in and asserted self-defense at trial.
The Court’s Holding
The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed Davis’s conviction, rejecting all four of his jury instruction challenges. First, the court held the trial court properly denied Davis’s request for a nondeadly force instruction on the murder charge. Under Colorado law (People v. Opana), when a defendant uses force that would be expected to and does produce death—such as shooting multiple bullets at close range—no nondeadly force instruction is required, regardless of the defendant’s subjective intent.
Second, any error in failing to define “great bodily injury” was not plain error. Although the jury received definitions of “bodily injury” and “serious bodily injury,” it was not plain error to omit a definition of “great bodily injury,” and even if it were obvious error, it was not substantial because the critical issue at trial was whether Davis reasonably believed the victim had a gun, not the severity of injury threshold.
Third, the court properly instructed the jury on the provocation exception to self-defense. Evidence supported this instruction: Davis assaulted Wells, pointed a gun, and confronted the men with a gun and aggressive language before the victim approached. Finally, a specific multiple assailants instruction was not required because the general self-defense instructions properly directed the jury to assess reasonableness considering all circumstances. Under Riley v. People, courts need not give a specific multiple assailants instruction so long as instructions require consideration of the totality of circumstances.
Key Takeaways
- When a defendant fires a gun at close range causing death, no nondeadly force self-defense instruction is required, even if the defendant claims he did not intend to kill or hit anyone.
- Failure to define “great bodily injury” in self-defense instructions is not plain error when the central issue at trial concerns whether the defendant reasonably perceived a threat, not injury severity.
- A provocation exception instruction is proper when evidence shows the defendant’s conduct (pointing a gun and issuing hostile commands) could be interpreted as provoking the confrontation.
- Colorado does not require a specific multiple assailants jury instruction if the general self-defense instructions require the jury to consider the totality of circumstances in assessing reasonableness.
Why It Matters
This decision provides important guidance on self-defense jury instructions in Colorado criminal trials. It clarifies that courts have significant discretion in tailoring instructions to the evidence and need not include instructions on theoretical alternatives (nondeadly force) when the facts establish the defendant used inherently deadly force. The decision also confirms that provocation exceptions can apply when a defendant’s own aggressive conduct invites a response, even if the defendant later claims self-defense.
For defendants asserting self-defense, this ruling narrows the factual scenarios in which jury instructions will require consideration of nondeadly alternatives and reinforces that pointing a gun and issuing confrontational language can constitute provocation. The decision also resolves uncertainty about whether stock self-defense instructions sufficiently address multiple assailants scenarios, holding that explicit multiple assailants language is not always necessary so long as the jury is directed to consider all circumstances.