Background
Mason Wold pleaded guilty to distribution of more than fifty grams of fentanyl, a level 1 drug felony, under section 18-18-405(1), (2)(a)(I)(D), C.R.S. 2026. The plea agreement stipulated to a sentencing range of twelve to eighteen years in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC). The Weld County District Court imposed an eighteen-year DOC sentence on December 20, 2024, making April 25, 2025, the 126-day deadline for a sentence-reduction motion under Crim. P. 35(b).
Four days before that deadline expired, defense counsel requested an extension of time to file a Rule 35(b) motion. Counsel cited DOC mail-processing delays, difficulties obtaining pertinent DOC records, and various personal and professional obligations as reasons additional time was needed. Two months later, the district court denied the request, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to extend the Rule 35(b) deadline.
Citing People v. Gresl, 89 P.3d 499 (Colo. App. 2003), the district court reasoned that, absent an agreement of the parties or a finding that the defendant had been unconstitutionally deprived of the opportunity to file a Rule 35(b) motion, it did not have jurisdiction to extend the deadline. Defense counsel promptly sought reconsideration, arguing that Crim. P. 45(b)(1) supplied jurisdiction because the extension had been requested before the Rule 35(b) deadline expired and that reliance on Gresl was misplaced. The court denied reconsideration, and Wold appealed. After filing the appeal, Wold filed a Rule 35(b) motion on the deadline requested in his extension motion; that motion remained pending in the district court.
The Court’s Holding
The Colorado Court of Appeals agreed with Wold that the district court abused its discretion by denying the extension request on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction. The court explained that whether to grant or deny an enlargement of time to file a Rule 35(b) motion is within the district court’s sound discretion, and that a decision based on a misapplication or misapprehension of the law can constitute an abuse of discretion. It reviewed de novo the district court’s determination of subject-matter jurisdiction and its interpretation of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Rule 35(b) requires a sentence-reduction motion to be filed within 126 days after sentencing. If no such motion is filed before that period expires, the district court’s jurisdiction to reduce or change the sentence terminates, although a court retains jurisdiction to resolve a timely filed motion within a reasonable time after the filing deadline. Rule 45(b), however, permits an extension “for cause shown” when requested before expiration of the original deadline, or after expiration when the failure to file timely resulted from excusable neglect.
The Colorado Supreme Court applied Rule 45(b)(2)’s excusable-neglect provision to an untimely Rule 35(b) motion in Swainson v. People, 712 P.2d 479, 480 (Colo. 1986). The Court of Appeals saw no reason Rule 45(b)(1) should not likewise govern an extension request made before the Rule 35(b) deadline expired. It would be anomalous, the court reasoned, to allow untimely motions based on excusable neglect where no extension was requested within the original deadline while prohibiting timely extension requests.
Because Wold’s counsel requested an extension before the deadline expired, the district court retained subject-matter jurisdiction and had authority under Rule 45(b)(1) to grant an extension “for cause shown.” Its contrary conclusion rested on a misapprehension of the law. Any reliance on Gresl was misplaced because that case concerned an untimely motion to reconsider a Rule 35(b) motion, not a request to extend the Rule 35(b) deadline; the defendant there had not requested an extension either before or after expiration.
Key Takeaways
- When an extension of the Rule 35(b) deadline is requested before that deadline expires, the district court retains jurisdiction and has authority under Crim. P. 45(b)(1) to grant an extension for cause shown.
- A district court abuses its discretion when it denies such a request based on the mistaken legal conclusion that it lacks jurisdiction.
- Gresl did not control because it involved an untimely motion to reconsider a Rule 35(b) motion and no extension request, unlike Wold’s pre-expiration request.
Why It Matters
The decision distinguishes a pre-expiration request for an extension under Rule 45(b)(1) from an untimely filing addressed through Rule 45(b)(2)’s excusable-neglect standard. A timely extension request does not itself establish cause or require an extension; the district court must exercise its discretion under the correct legal standard.
The Court of Appeals therefore reversed the order denying Wold’s extension motion and remanded with directions to consider whether he showed cause to extend the Rule 35(b) deadline. If the district court finds cause for the requested extension, it should then consider the merits of Wold’s pending Rule 35(b) motion. The appellate court did not decide that cause existed or that Wold was entitled to a sentence reduction.