Background
Edward Brozynski was driving westbound near Farmington when his car crossed into the eastbound side of Colt Highway and collided head-on with a vehicle carrying four people traveling from Quebec for a relative’s funeral. Two passengers died, and the driver and another passenger suffered serious injuries. First responders observed signs that Brozynski was intoxicated. Testing showed blood alcohol concentrations of 0.18 and 0.08 in samples drawn several hours apart, as well as therapeutic levels of zolpidem, oxycodone, and meprobamate.
Brozynski testified that he had consumed two Bloody Marys, taken prescription Ambien, and fallen asleep. He said that he did not intend to drive and could not remember driving, and the defense argued that Ambien-induced “sleep driving” caused the collision. A jury convicted him of two counts each of first-degree manslaughter, first-degree assault, second-degree manslaughter with a motor vehicle, and second-degree assault with a motor vehicle, plus two operating-under-the-influence counts. He received a total effective sentence of twenty years, suspended after seventeen years, followed by three years of probation.
On appeal, Brozynski identified more than twenty statements and questions from the prosecutor’s cross-examination, closing argument, and rebuttal. He contended that the alleged improprieties, individually and cumulatively, deprived him of a fair trial and required a new trial.
The Court’s Holding
The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment. It rejected Brozynski’s claims that the prosecutor disobeyed the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, explaining that the relevant rulings did not unambiguously identify the prohibited matter and that the prosecutor rephrased the challenged questions or comments. It also held that the prosecutor did not improperly denigrate defense counsel by suggesting that an attorney introduced the sleep-driving theory because those remarks addressed the defense theory, were tied to Brozynski’s testimony, and did not imply that counsel intentionally sought to deceive the jury.
The court likewise concluded that the challenged closing-argument remarks did not improperly appeal to the jurors’ emotions because they relied on evidence, reasonable inferences, or common knowledge; responded to the defense theory; and did not unduly provoke or distract the jury. Most of the challenged cross-examination also properly sought to impeach or clarify Brozynski’s testimony or was supported by the trial evidence. The court declined to review his inadequately briefed claim concerning comments about pretrial custody, supervision, and possible consequences of conviction.
The court found one impropriety: during cross-examination, the prosecutor told Brozynski that he “should feel terrible” because he had “killed two people.” Applying the factors from State v. Williams, however, the court held that this isolated remark did not deprive Brozynski of a fair trial and created no reasonable likelihood of a different verdict.
Key Takeaways
- A prosecutor violates a trial court’s evidentiary order only when the order unambiguously identifies the prohibited matter; rephrasing after an unclear ruling did not establish impropriety here.
- Forceful criticism of a defense theory is not necessarily an improper attack on defense counsel, particularly when grounded in testimony and reasonable inferences.
- An isolated improper remark does not require a new trial unless, under the Williams factors, it caused sufficient prejudice to undermine the fairness of the proceeding.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the distinction between prosecutorial impropriety and a due process violation. Even when a prosecutor crosses the line, reversal requires a separate showing that the conduct prejudiced the defense and created a reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been different.
It also underscores the importance of specific trial objections and developed appellate briefing. Ambiguous evidentiary rulings may not support a claim that the prosecutor deliberately disobeyed the court, and claims lacking substantive analysis may go unreviewed.