Background
Jonathan Lopez pleaded guilty to being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm. During sentencing, the district court significantly increased his sentence based on the U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 2K2.1(a)(2), which applies to defendants with at least two prior felony convictions for a “crime of violence.” The court determined that Lopez’s two prior California convictions for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (Cal. Penal Code § 273.5) qualified as crimes of violence.
This enhancement raised Lopez’s base offense level from 14 to 24, substantially increasing his recommended sentence under the Guidelines from a range that would have started much lower to one of 77-96 months. The district court, noting it was bound by existing Ninth Circuit precedent, imposed a sentence of 67 months. Lopez appealed, specifically challenging the court’s finding that his prior convictions under § 273.5 were categorical crimes of violence.
The Court’s Holding
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated Lopez’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. The court held that a conviction under California Penal Code § 273.5 is not categorically a “crime of violence” for the purposes of the federal sentencing enhancement. The court found that its prior precedents, which held otherwise, were “clearly irreconcilable” with intervening higher authority, namely the Supreme Court’s decision in Borden v. United States (2021) and the Ninth Circuit’s own en banc ruling in United States v. Gomez (2026).
The court reasoned that under Borden, an offense only qualifies as a crime of violence if it requires a mental state (mens rea) greater than recklessness as to the use of force against another person. The court analyzed § 273.5 and determined that it is a general intent crime under California law. A person can be convicted for willfully committing an act that results in injury, without intending to injure the victim or even being aware that force would be applied to them. Since the statute’s minimum required mental state does not rise above recklessness with respect to directing force at another, it does not meet the federal definition of a “crime of violence.” Accordingly, the district court erred by applying the sentence enhancement.
Key Takeaways
- A prior conviction under California Penal Code § 273.5 for inflicting corporal injury cannot be automatically used as a “crime of violence” to enhance a federal sentence.
- For a state offense to be a categorical “crime of violence” under the federal elements clause, it must require a mental state of purpose or knowledge—not just recklessness—that force will be directed at another person.
- The Ninth Circuit explicitly overruled its own prior cases on this issue, demonstrating the significant impact of the Supreme Court’s Borden decision on the interpretation of federal sentencing enhancements.
Why It Matters
This ruling significantly curtails the use of a common California domestic violence conviction to trigger severe sentence enhancements in federal firearms cases within the Ninth Circuit. Defendants with prior § 273.5 convictions will no longer face automatic and substantial increases in their sentences on the grounds that those offenses are “crimes of violence.” The decision forces federal courts to look more granularly at the minimum conduct criminalized by a state statute, rather than just its title or the resulting harm.
The case serves as an important clarification of the “crime of violence” definition in the post-Borden landscape. It reinforces that a purposeful or knowing mental state with respect to the application of force is a critical requirement, preventing federal sentencing law from treating reckless acts that happen to cause injury with the same severity as intentionally violent conduct. This will lead to more nuanced sentencing and likely shorter prison terms for some defendants with certain prior state convictions.