United States v. Girard and Harry — Convictions affirmed despite public-trial violations

Case
United States of America v. Paul Girard, a/k/a Bogus, and Kareem Harry, a/k/a Crumbull
Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date Decided
May 26, 2026
Docket No.
24-2097 & 24-2148
Topics
Sixth Amendment public trial right, COVID-19 courtroom access, plain error review

Background

Paul Girard headed a violent drug-trafficking enterprise in the U.S. Virgin Islands and was convicted of 22 counts including drug, firearm, and racketeering charges. Kareem Harry, an armorer for the enterprise, was convicted of seven counts of racketeering and firearms charges. Their jury trial took place in March 2022, commencing the day after the District Court of the Virgin Islands issued an order resuming in-person proceedings following COVID-19 suspensions.

The trial presented access challenges tied to pandemic precautions. On the first day, the District Court required all spectators to observe from an overflow room with audiovisual feed, though the courtroom itself contained available seating. After the first day, the court permitted limited in-person viewing with social distancing. However, federal marshals prevented the defendants’ mothers from entering the courtroom on several subsequent days despite available seating, apparently operating under an unstated policy about family access. Neither defendant contemporaneously objected to these exclusions.

The Court’s Holding

The Third Circuit identified two Sixth Amendment public-trial violations. First, requiring all spectators to watch remotely on day one without justifying why alternatives were inadequate constituted courtroom closure requiring an overriding governmental interest and consideration of less restrictive measures. The court acknowledged that protecting trial participants from COVID-19 is a compelling interest, but found the District Court had not explained why sparse seating was inadequate on day one when it permitted spectators with social distancing thereafter. Second, excluding the defendants’ mothers on later days when seats were available in the courtroom was error, as their physical presence served the solemnity and accountability purposes of the public-trial right.

However, the Third Circuit affirmed the convictions. Because neither defendant lodged adequate contemporaneous objections, review proceeded under the plain-error standard, which requires errors to have seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings to warrant reversal. The court found minimal harm because: (1) the trial maintained publicity through available viewing options; (2) the court demonstrated neutrality—the first-day closure reflected good-faith pandemic precautions, and the judge was unaware of the marshals’ exclusion actions and remedied them when notified; and (3) professionalism was not undermined. Against these modest costs of the error stood the substantial burdens of retrying a three-week racketeering conspiracy case with nearly 50 witnesses concluded four years prior.

Key Takeaways

  • While COVID-19 precautions may justify requiring remote spectating, trial courts must identify overriding interests and consider less restrictive alternatives before doing so; unexplained disparities between different trial days raise questions about adequacy of justification.
  • Excluding specific spectators (as opposed to closing an entire courtroom) requires only a substantial reason—not an overriding interest—but still demands consideration of alternatives, factual findings, and an identifiable justification in the record.
  • Plain-error review of Sixth Amendment violations weighs the error’s impact on publicity, neutrality, and professionalism against the costs of retrial; even where violations are found, affirmed if the errors caused minimal prejudice to these values.
  • A defendant’s failure to object contemporaneously to public-trial violations significantly limits appellate remedies, requiring plain error to secure reversal rather than merits review.

Why It Matters

This decision clarifies how courts may accommodate public-health concerns while protecting Sixth Amendment openness. It confirms that remote viewing, while sometimes necessary, does not fully substitute for physical courtroom presence and requires justification. The court rejected a “trivial closure” doctrine that would exempt brief or narrow courtroom restrictions from Sixth Amendment scrutiny, emphasizing that even temporary closures implicating opening arguments and evidence merit constitutional analysis. This matters for post-pandemic courtroom management and any future health emergencies requiring similar restrictions.

The opinion also sets standards for excluding individual spectators—family members in particular—establishing that available seating and lack of identified misbehavior must support continued exclusions. Significantly, the court imposed accountability even for marshals’ actions: the defendants’ deprivation of public-trial rights occurred despite the judge’s unawareness, and that ignorance did not cure the constitutional error, though it bolstered the finding that reversal was unwarranted under the narrow lens of plain-error review. For defendants contesting trial access, the case underscores the importance of contemporaneous, particularized objections to preserve appellate review beyond the stringent plain-error standard.

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