United States v. Gutierrez — Fourth Circuit affirmed MS-13 racketeering and murder convictions

Case
United States of America v. Marvin Menjivar Gutierrez
Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Judge
RICHARDSON; QUATTLEBAUM; BERNER
Date Decided
September 3, 2026
Docket No.
24-4325
Topics
Criminal Law; RICO; Curative Instructions; Due Process
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Marvin Menjivar Gutierrez, known as “Astuto,” was identified as the First Word, or leader, of the Sitios Locos Salvatrucha clique of MS-13. Federal prosecutors alleged that he and other clique members participated in racketeering, cocaine distribution, and violent crimes arising from a series of 2019 murders in Woodbridge, Virginia.

Gutierrez was tried jointly with Cristian Ariel Arevalo Arias and Carlos Jose Turcios Villatoro. The jury convicted Gutierrez of a RICO conspiracy, cocaine-distribution conspiracy, VICAR conspiracy to commit murder, and VICAR murder in connection with the killing of Milton Beltran Lopez. The district court sentenced him to concurrent terms that included life imprisonment.

After closing arguments, the district court found that Turcios’s lawyer had vouched for witnesses, referred to matters outside the evidence, and otherwise made an improper summation. It instructed the jury to disregard Turcios’s entire closing argument. Gutierrez and Arevalo argued that Turcios’s remarks nevertheless prejudiced their defenses and warranted a mistrial.

The Court’s Holding

The Fourth Circuit affirmed Gutierrez’s convictions. Without deciding whether Turcios’s closing argument was improper, the court held that the district court’s instruction to disregard that argument cured any prejudice to Gutierrez. Jurors are presumed to follow curative instructions, and this was not an exceptional case in which the challenged material made an impression that an instruction could not realistically erase.

The court also rejected Gutierrez’s other asserted grounds for reversal. It found no reversible error in the limits placed on cross-examination of a cooperating witness or in the refusal to dismiss the indictment based on the deportation of a potential witness, the failure to preserve jail-call recordings or notes, and the government’s delayed disclosure of information about a tipster. Comparable evidence concerning the alleged jail call was available, bad faith was not shown, and barring a cooperating witness from testifying for the government adequately addressed any late-disclosure violation.

Although the court vacated Turcios’s convictions because striking his entire summation effectively deprived him of a closing argument, that ruling did not disturb Gutierrez’s judgment. The curative instruction removed Turcios’s challenged argument from consideration in Gutierrez’s case rather than denying Gutierrez his own defense.

Key Takeaways

  • An instruction directing jurors to disregard a codefendant’s entire closing argument can cure prejudice to another defendant when the case does not present the exceptional circumstances required to overcome the presumption that jurors follow instructions.
  • Failure to preserve potentially useful evidence violates due process only upon a showing of police bad faith; routine deletion under a jail’s retention policy did not satisfy that standard here.
  • Dismissal was not warranted for delayed disclosure of favorable information where the defense received and used the material at trial, did not request a continuance, and obtained a sanction barring the relevant witness from testifying for the government.

Why It Matters

The decision distinguishes sharply between the effect of an overbroad curative instruction on the defendant whose summation was stricken and its effect on codefendants. Erasing Turcios’s entire closing argument required vacatur of his convictions, but the same instruction protected Gutierrez from any spillover prejudice and supported affirmance of his convictions.

The opinion also reinforces the demanding standards governing claims based on deported witnesses, unpreserved evidence, and delayed Brady disclosures. Defendants must show material prejudice and, where evidence was merely potentially useful, bad faith; dismissal remains an extraordinary remedy when narrower measures can protect the defense.

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