Background
William Scott Kendall pleaded guilty in February 2024 to possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced him to 18 months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release, imposing standard conditions plus special conditions for substance abuse treatment, mental health treatment, anger management, and battering intervention programming. His conviction appeal was affirmed in July 2025.
Kendall’s supervised release began August 30, 2024. Less than a month later, the Probation Office petitioned for revocation, alleging he had refused substance abuse treatment and sent threats to his probation officer. Kendall pled true to both allegations. The district court revoked his supervised release, imposed six months in custody, and thirty months of supervised release (the “First Revocation”). The written judgment included a home detention requirement incorporated through reference to an appendix in a sentencing worksheet.
While Kendall’s appeal from the First Revocation was pending, his supervised release was revoked again on July 7, 2025, for failure to comply with location monitoring and probation officer instructions. The district court imposed three months’ incarceration and twenty-four months’ supervised release, reimposing the same conditions from the First Revocation (the “Second Revocation”).
The Court’s Holding
The Fifth Circuit held that the appeal was not entirely moot despite the later revocation, because the conditions underlying the First Revocation formed the basis for the Second Revocation. Under the collateral consequences doctrine and established precedent, a defendant challenging previously imposed conditions remains subject to jurisdiction when those conditions support a subsequent revocation and sentence. A favorable ruling invalidating improper conditions could support a motion to modify the defendant’s current sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, provided the district court retained sentencing authority.
The court then addressed the validity of the supervised release conditions. The district court had orally pronounced several special conditions but then stated “they will be imposed as stated and as set out in the Appendix there,” referring to an appendix to the Judge’s Sentencing Options Worksheet. The Government conceded that the worksheet was never disclosed to the defendant or his counsel, and the record did not show the defendant reviewed it. The court held that under its precedent established in United States v. Diggles, due process requires that before adopting a written list of conditions, the district court must ensure the defendant had an opportunity to review the document with counsel. Here, the appendix was never disclosed, so the defendant could not have known of the home detention requirement tucked within the location monitoring condition.
The court emphasized that home detention is an especially restrictive condition—Congress cautioned it should only be imposed as “an alternative to incarceration” under 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(19). Home detention is not a natural follow-on to location monitoring, so pronouncing the latter would not alert counsel and the defendant to the former. The court found the district court abused its discretion by adopting undisclosed conditions without notice or opportunity to object and vacated the two improperly pronounced conditions: the home detention special condition and Standard Condition 13 (requirement to follow probation officer instructions).
Key Takeaways
- An appeal from a revocation of supervised release is not moot if conditions from that revocation form the basis for a subsequent revocation, allowing a defendant to seek modification of the current sentence through collateral relief.
- Before adopting a written list of supervised release conditions at sentencing, the district court must ensure the defendant had an opportunity to review and object to the document with counsel—adoption by reference to an undisclosed appendix or worksheet fails to satisfy due process.
- Home detention is a highly restrictive condition requiring explicit oral pronouncement; it cannot be imposed solely through incorporation into a location monitoring condition without clear notice and opportunity to object.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies important procedural safeguards at sentencing in supervised release revocation proceedings. Many district courts rely on standardized sentencing worksheets and adopt conditions by reference to appendices or related documents. Kendall requires that defendants receive actual notice of and opportunity to object to all proposed conditions, not merely a general reference to an appendix. Significantly, the court’s emphasis on home detention as a uniquely restrictive condition signals heightened scrutiny: sentencing courts must pronounce such conditions explicitly, not bury them in referenced documents.
The decision also has implications for appellate jurisdiction in revocation cases. By holding that a defendant may challenge conditions underlying a superseding revocation, the court preserves meaningful appellate review in situations where revocations follow in succession. This prevents the practical mooting of procedural challenges simply because a defendant’s sentence has been modified while an appeal is pending, ensuring that fundamental due process protections at sentencing remain enforceable.