Background
Christopher Lloyd pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon after he fell asleep with a gun at an Indiana White Castle. His Sentencing Guidelines calculation depended on whether he had at least two prior felony convictions for a crime of violence or controlled-substance offense.
The presentence report identified an Indiana cocaine-dealing conviction and an Indiana conviction for conspiracy to commit armed robbery. Lloyd argued that the conspiracy conviction did not qualify as a crime of violence because Indiana permits a unilateral conspiracy, in which the only supposed coconspirator may be an undercover agent who does not genuinely agree to commit the crime. The district court rejected that argument, calculated a Guidelines range of 77 to 96 months, and imposed a 96-month sentence.
The Court’s Holding
The Seventh Circuit held that the generic definition of conspiracy incorporated by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 requires a bilateral agreement between genuine participants. The relevant point in time was 1989, when the Sentencing Commission first added conspiracy to the crime-of-violence definition—not 2023, when the Commission moved the inchoate-offense language from the commentary into the guideline’s text without changing it substantively.
Federal law, the law of a majority of states, and contemporary legal dictionaries showed that conspiracy was generally understood in 1989 as bilateral. Because Indiana’s statute also covers unilateral conspiracies, it sweeps more broadly than generic conspiracy under the categorical approach. Lloyd’s conviction therefore could not support the enhanced base offense level, even though his actual conspiracy was bilateral. The court vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing.
Key Takeaways
- Generic conspiracy under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 is limited to bilateral conspiracies requiring genuine agreement between at least two participants.
- The generic offense is defined as of 1989 because the 2023 amendment merely relocated the inchoate-offense language without substantively changing it.
- An Indiana conspiracy conviction cannot qualify categorically as a crime of violence under § 4B1.2 because Indiana also criminalizes unilateral conspiracies.
Why It Matters
The decision limits federal sentencing enhancements based on conspiracy convictions from Indiana and other states whose statutes permit unilateral conspiracy. Courts applying the categorical approach must compare statutory elements, not the defendant’s actual conduct.
The ruling may produce different federal sentencing outcomes for identical conduct depending on the state of conviction. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that disparity but concluded that it follows from the categorical approach and suggested that the Sentencing Commission could expressly include unilateral conspiracies if it wants a broader rule.