Background
Dimitri McKenzie responded to an online advertisement for commercial sex, believing he was soliciting a 14-year-old girl named “Bri.” The advertisement was part of an undercover operation conducted by Homeland Security Investigations in the Boston area. Agent Kristen Draper, posing as a commercial sex provider, engaged McKenzie in text and phone conversations in which she explicitly told him the available girls were 14 and 12 years old. McKenzie expressed interest in the 14-year-old after initially claiming he was “not into anything under 18.”
Over the course of the evening, McKenzie and the agent discussed details, pricing, and verification. The agent sent McKenzie an age-regressed image of an adult woman created through software manipulation. When McKenzie agreed to proceed and arrived at a hotel parking lot with $100 to complete the transaction, federal agents arrested him. No actual minor was involved in the operation at any stage.
The Court’s Holding
The First Circuit affirmed McKenzie’s conviction for attempted sex trafficking of a child under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591 and 1594. The court rejected McKenzie’s argument that, absent an actual minor, the government must prove he subjectively believed the person was under 18. Instead, the court held that attempted sex trafficking of a minor requires proof that the defendant either believed or recklessly disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the person solicited for commercial sex was under 18.
The court’s analysis drew on the Model Penal Code framework for attempt liability. It classified the age of the person solicited as a “circumstance” of the offense, distinct from the defendant’s conduct (solicitation) and the intended result (commercial sex engagement). For such circumstances in attempt prosecutions, the defendant need only have the same culpability required for the completed crime—here, either knowledge or reckless disregard. This holds true regardless of whether an actual minor is involved.
The court also found support in congressional intent reflected in the 2015 Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, which implicitly affirmed that sting operations without actual minors could support attempted sex trafficking convictions, without requiring courts to impose a subjective-belief standard.
Key Takeaways
- Attempted sex trafficking of a minor does not require proof that the defendant subjectively believed the solicited person was under 18; reckless disregard as to age suffices.
- No actual minor must be present for an attempt conviction; undercover operations in which the supposed minor does not exist are sufficient.
- Under attempt liability doctrine, the defendant’s required mental state as to “circumstances” matches the mental state required for the completed offense.
- The 2015 Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act reflects congressional intent to permit convictions arising from sting operations without actual minors.
Why It Matters
This decision significantly clarifies federal sex-trafficking law by resolving a circuit split question: whether defendants caught in sting operations can be convicted of attempting to traffic minors when no actual child is present. The First Circuit’s holding that reckless disregard suffices—even without proof of subjective belief—makes it easier for prosecutors to secure convictions in these cases, eliminating the need to establish what the defendant actually thought about age.
For law enforcement, the ruling validates the continued use of undercover operations posing as minors or fictitious minors as an effective prosecutorial tool. For defense counsel, the decision narrows the available arguments in cases involving sting operations: defendants cannot simply claim they did not believe the supposed minor was actually underage if evidence shows they consciously disregarded a substantial risk of underage involvement.