United States v. Morgan — Tenth Circuit Affirms Child Pornography Convictions, Clarifies “Lascivious Exhibition” Standard

Case
United States of America v. Brett Morgan
Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Judge
Carson; Kelly; Rossman
Date Decided
November 5, 2026
Docket No.
24-3186
Topics
Child Exploitation, Criminal Law, Evidence, Jury Instructions
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Brett Morgan was convicted by a jury in the District of Kansas on ten counts related to the sexual exploitation of five young girls in his care. The charges included three counts of production of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e), six counts of attempted production under the same statute, and one count of possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). The evidence showed that Morgan secretly filmed and photographed the victims—identified as MV1 through MV5—mostly while they were nude in his bathtub, using a hidden camera concealed in a lightbulb. He also created a zoomed-in screenshot of one victim’s genitals from a video and possessed a separate image of child pornography on his phone.

The investigation began after seven-year-old MV3 disclosed the abuse to her parents, who contacted law enforcement. Detective Jonathan Elledge interviewed Morgan and seized his phone, leading to the discovery of the recordings. At trial, the jury heard testimony from law enforcement, victims’ parents, and MV3, and viewed the videos and photos. The district court sentenced Morgan to eighty years in prison. Morgan appealed, raising six challenges to his convictions.

The Court’s Holding

The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Carson and joined by Judges Kelly and Rossman, affirmed all convictions. The court first addressed the legal standard for “lascivious exhibition” under § 2256(2)(A)(v), rejecting Morgan’s argument that a minor must engage in conduct connoting a sexual act. Relying on United States v. Wolf, 890 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1989), and United States v. Wells, 843 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2016), the court held that lasciviousness is a characteristic of the depiction, not the child’s conduct. A defendant “uses” a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct by producing a visual depiction of a lascivious exhibition of the minor’s genitals, even if the minor’s behavior is innocent.

Applying this standard, the court found sufficient evidence supported the attempted production convictions (Counts 3–7, 9). Morgan’s actions—purchasing a hidden camera, filming victims in a sexually suggestive setting, repositioning the camera to focus on genitals, and directing victims to display themselves—demonstrated specific intent and a substantial step toward producing child pornography. The court also upheld the production conviction under Count 8, holding that creating a zoomed-in screenshot from a video constituted “use” of the minor under § 2251, as the statute criminalizes adapting or modifying images to create lascivious depictions.

The court rejected Morgan’s challenges to the jury instructions. It held that the district court did not err in instructing the jury on the six Dost factors (from United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986)) as non-exclusive aids to determine lasciviousness, joining the majority of circuits that permit their use. The instruction properly required the jury to consider the overall content of each depiction and did not allow conviction based solely on nudity or the defendant’s subjective response. The court also found no error in the attempt instruction, which accurately conveyed the specific intent requirement.

Regarding evidentiary rulings, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting uncharged sexual abuse evidence as res gestae (intrinsic to the charged crimes) or under Federal Rule of Evidence 414. However, it found error in admitting MV3’s forensic interview statements under the residual hearsay exception (Rule 807) after her live testimony, as the statements were not more probative than her testimony and the circumstances were not extraordinary. The court deemed this error harmless because the statements were cumulative of other evidence and the district court provided limiting instructions.

Finally, the court rejected Morgan’s multiplicity argument under the Double Jeopardy Clause, holding that charging separate counts for each minor depicted in a single image was not plainly erroneous. It also declined to find cumulative error, as only one preserved error existed.

Key Takeaways

  • A minor’s innocent conduct can constitute “sexually explicit conduct” under 18 U.S.C. § 2251 if the defendant depicts it in a lascivious manner; lasciviousness depends on the depiction’s overall content, not the child’s actions or intent.
  • Creating a zoomed-in or altered image from an original video constitutes “use” of a minor under § 2251, as the statute prohibits adapting or modifying depictions to create child pornography.
  • The Dost factors may be used in jury instructions as non-definitional aids to assess lasciviousness, provided the jury is instructed to consider the depiction’s overall content.
  • Evidence of uncharged sexual abuse may be admitted as res gestae if inextricably intertwined with the charged conduct, but residual hearsay (Rule 807) requires extraordinary circumstances and is improper when cumulative of live testimony.
  • Charging separate counts for each minor depicted in a single image under § 2251 is not plainly multiplicitous, as each use of a minor may constitute a distinct offense.

Why It Matters

This decision reinforces the Tenth Circuit’s broad interpretation of the child exploitation statutes, emphasizing that the harm to children stems from their exploitation as subjects of pornography, not their own conduct. By clarifying that lasciviousness is determined by the depiction’s content and the producer’s intent, the court lowers the barrier for prosecuting cases involving secret recordings or altered images, where victims may not engage in overtly sexual behavior.

The ruling also provides guidance on the use of Dost factors in jury instructions, aligning with most circuits while cautioning against their mechanical application. Additionally, the court’s harmless-error analysis of the Rule 807 violation underscores the importance of limiting instructions and cumulative evidence in mitigating evidentiary errors. For practitioners, the case highlights the need to preserve objections to hearsay and multiplicity arguments pretrial, as unpreserved claims face steep plain-error review.

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