Background
Tami Kutz Robertson pleaded guilty in 2022 to aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, simple battery, and tampering with evidence following a domestic dispute with her husband. She was sentenced to concurrent probation terms. In February 2024, Robertson admitted to a first probation violation, and the court reinstated her probation with an added condition requiring her to maintain a 500-foot distance from her husband.
In March 2024, the State accused Robertson of a second probation violation. Following a hearing in January 2025, the trial court found the violation proven and revoked Robertson’s probation, sentencing her to 36.5 months concurrent imprisonment. Critically, although the court found that Robertson qualified as a violent felony offender of special concern (VFOSC), it failed to make any written or oral findings regarding whether she posed a danger to the community—a requirement mandated by section 948.06(8)(e), Florida Statutes.
Robertson filed a motion to correct sentencing errors citing precedent from McCray v. State. At a July 2025 hearing on that motion, the trial court and the State stipulated that the court had erred by omitting the dangerousness findings. Rather than conduct a new sentencing hearing, the trial court entered a written order finding that Robertson does not pose a danger to the community and denied Robertson’s request for a new sentencing hearing.
The Court’s Holding
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the sentencing order and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. The court held that compliance with section 948.06(8) is mandatory and that the trial court’s failure to make dangerousness findings required reversal and remand, not merely a corrective written order.
The court reasoned that even though the parties agreed Robertson poses no danger to the community, the proper remedy was a complete new sentencing hearing at which Robertson could present mitigating evidence and the trial court could make the statutorily required dangerousness determination. The court cited Gibson v. State (2025) and McCray v. State (2019), establishing that trial courts cannot sidestep the sentencing hearing requirement by issuing post-hoc findings without affording the defendant a full opportunity to be heard.
The court emphasized that section 948.06(8) contains no exception permitting courts to bypass new sentencing hearings when the prison sentence happens to be appropriate regardless of dangerousness. The procedural protections for VFOSCs are mandatory and not subject to waiver or stipulation.
Key Takeaways
- Trial courts must make explicit written findings about whether a VFOSC poses a danger to the community before revoking probation; oral findings alone are insufficient.
- Failure to make dangerousness findings requires reversal and remand for a new sentencing hearing—entering a corrective written order without a hearing does not cure the error.
- Parties cannot stipulate away the requirement for a new sentencing hearing; the procedural protections of section 948.06(8) are mandatory.
- The dangerousness determination must be based on statutory factors including the nature of the violation, the offender’s present conduct and history, amenability to non-incarceration sanctions, and other relevant facts.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that procedural protections for violent felony offenders of special concern are strictly mandatory and courts cannot circumvent them through procedural shortcuts or party stipulations. Even when all parties agree on the appropriate outcome, the statutory framework requires full compliance with written findings and sentencing hearings. Trial courts frequently preside over probation revocations, and this holding ensures that defendants in these proceedings receive the full procedural safeguards the legislature intended.
For practitioners, the decision clarifies that motions to correct sentencing errors based on omitted dangerousness findings will succeed and result in remand for new sentencing hearings—not merely curative written orders. Defense counsel should scrutinize probation revocation sentences to ensure that dangerousness findings are explicit, written, and supported by the statutory factors.