Background
Eric Bernard Hills, then 17 years old, shot Branden Lewis six times on November 11, 2020, in a bedroom at Lewis’s estranged wife’s home. Hills and Destiney Lewis, Lewis’s estranged spouse, were in a romantic relationship. That morning, Lewis returned to the house unexpectedly to retrieve a firearm he had left there. When Lewis entered the bedroom where Hills and Destiney were present, Hills fired six 9mm rounds, killing Lewis at the scene. Hills was arrested after attempting to flee in a vehicle he had ordered moments after the shooting.
A Chatham County grand jury indicted Hills on malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. At trial in March 2024, the jury found him guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Hills to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole on the malice murder count and five consecutive years for the firearm possession count. On appeal, Hills’s sole argument was that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Hills’s convictions and rejected his argument that a voluntary manslaughter instruction should have been given. The court held that no evidence presented at trial supported a voluntary manslaughter charge. Under Georgia law, voluntary manslaughter requires that a defendant act “solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person.” The evidence here showed Hills acted out of fear and in self-defense, not passion.
The court distinguished Hills’s case from Allen v. State, which held that discovery of a partner’s sexual infidelity can constitute provocation warranting a voluntary manslaughter instruction. The court noted that Hills was the knowing third party in an affair with Destiney, not the wronged spouse discovering infidelity, and Hills shot Lewis—not another party—in response to Lewis entering the bedroom, not in response to discovery of any infidelity. The court observed the difficulty in allowing a person knowingly engaged in infidelity to claim provocation from that same infidelity.
Additionally, the evidence showed Lewis had never directly threatened Hills, was not armed when entering the bedroom, likely did not know Hills was present, and Hills admitted to Detective Hildebrand that he shot Lewis out of fear when Lewis “raised his hand” at him. This evidence demonstrated fear and self-defense, not the passion required for voluntary manslaughter. Accordingly, the trial court’s refusal to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter was neither error nor plain error.
Key Takeaways
- A voluntary manslaughter instruction requires at least slight evidence that the defendant acted from sudden, violent, and irresistible passion caused by serious provocation—not fear or self-defense.
- Being a knowing participant in an affair does not constitute the serious provocation necessary for voluntary manslaughter, even when the other party threatens violence.
- A defendant must object to jury instructions after the final charge is given to preserve the issue for ordinary appellate review; failure to do so limits review to plain error only.
- Georgia courts distinguish between actions motivated by passion and those motivated by fear or self-preservation when determining whether provocation supports a lesser-included offense instruction.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces Georgia’s objective standard for voluntary manslaughter, focusing on what would provoke a reasonable person rather than the subjective emotional state of the defendant. For criminal practitioners, it clarifies that relationship disputes involving infidelity do not automatically warrant voluntary manslaughter instructions, particularly where the defendant was the knowing third party. The court’s analysis emphasizes that fear-based defenses (such as self-defense) are categorically distinct from passion-based defenses and should not be conflated when determining jury charge requests.
The ruling also has procedural significance: defendants must renew objections to jury instructions after the final charge to preserve appellate review, or face the heightened plain error standard. Trial courts have discretion to refuse lesser-included offense instructions when the evidence does not support them, and appellate courts will defer to that exercise of discretion unless error is plain and obvious.