Scott v. State — Georgia Supreme Court affirms malice murder conviction, holds involuntary manslaughter jury instruction not warranted

Case
Christopher Scott v. The State
Court
Supreme Court of Georgia
Judge
PINSON (Brian Kemp, 2022)
Date Decided
May 19, 2026
Docket No.
S26A0454
Topics
Malice murder, Jury instructions, Involuntary manslaughter, Lesser included offenses
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Christopher Scott was convicted by a Chatham County jury of the malice murder of his wife, Tiffany Scott, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Tiffany died on June 21, 2019, from a contact gunshot wound to the head. Evidence at trial showed that the couple had been arguing for days over Scott’s infidelity, that Tiffany had planned to leave him, and that Scott had once told a friend he would kill Tiffany before letting her go. On the night of the shooting, Scott retrieved a Taurus nine-millimeter pistol from inside the house during an argument in the garage, returned to the garage, and shot Tiffany at contact range. Scott’s children, who were present in the home, provided accounts that were admitted at trial. Scott told investigators he had not meant to shoot Tiffany and suggested his prosthetic leg may have caused him to stumble, but no witness testified that Scott made this claim in his statement.

The trial court sentenced Scott to life without the possibility of parole for malice murder, plus a consecutive five-year term for firearm possession. At the charge conference during trial, Scott withdrew a prior request for a lawful-act involuntary manslaughter instruction and instead requested that the jury be charged on unlawful-act involuntary manslaughter predicated on the misdemeanors of reckless conduct and pointing a pistol. The trial court declined to give those instructions, agreeing with the State that the evidence showed aggravated assault — a felony — rather than a misdemeanor, and that a felony cannot serve as the predicate unlawful act for involuntary manslaughter under Georgia law. The motion for new trial was denied in August 2025, and Scott appealed.

The Court’s Holding

The Supreme Court of Georgia unanimously affirmed Scott’s convictions and sentences. As to unlawful-act involuntary manslaughter (OCGA § 16-5-3(a)), the Court held that the trial court correctly refused the requested instruction on two independent grounds. First, the evidence did not rise to even the “slight evidence” threshold needed to support a charge on reckless conduct or pointing a pistol: the record contained no testimony that Scott actually told investigators he stumbled, and the element of intentional aiming required for pointing a pistol was absent under the accident theory Scott advanced. Second, and dispositively, the evidence as a whole showed that Scott committed aggravated assault — a felony — by purposefully placing a gun against Tiffany’s head during the confrontation, and a felony cannot serve as the predicate unlawful act for involuntary manslaughter even when the same conduct could theoretically be characterized as a lesser misdemeanor.

As to lawful-act involuntary manslaughter (OCGA § 16-5-3(b)), the Court held that Scott affirmatively waived any right to that instruction by withdrawing his earlier request at the charge conference. Because affirmative waiver forecloses plain error review, Scott could not satisfy the requirements for plain error relief on that claim. The decision was unanimous, with Presiding Justice Warren not participating.

Key Takeaways

  • Under Georgia law, a trial court need not charge involuntary manslaughter by unlawful act when the evidence shows the defendant committed an aggravated assault — a felony — regardless of whether the conduct could also be characterized as a lesser misdemeanor such as reckless conduct or pointing a pistol.
  • Even the low “slight evidence” standard for a lesser-included-offense instruction is not met when the defendant’s accident theory is unsupported by actual testimony and the physical evidence (a contact wound) is inconsistent with an accidental discharge caused by stumbling.
  • A defendant who affirmatively withdraws a requested jury instruction at the charge conference has waived that issue and cannot obtain plain error review on appeal, even if the omitted instruction might otherwise have been warranted.
  • Statements by a victim such as “shoot me” immediately before being shot — rather than negating the defendant’s culpability — can support an inference that the victim was in reasonable apprehension of violent injury, satisfying an element of aggravated assault.

Why It Matters

This decision reinforces the boundary between misdemeanor-predicate involuntary manslaughter and felony aggravated assault in Georgia homicide cases. Defense counsel who frame an accidental-shooting theory must present actual evidence of the precise misdemeanor conduct alleged; a general claim that a shooting “could have been” an accident is insufficient when the physical and testimonial evidence points to deliberate, threatening conduct. The opinion also underscores that Georgia courts will hold defendants to strategic choices made at trial: withdrawing a jury-instruction request is a form of affirmative waiver that closes off plain error review, not merely a failure to object.

For practitioners, the case is a reminder to carefully evaluate whether evidence of an unlawful-act theory is genuinely present before withdrawing a lawful-act theory — and that the two theories may need to be preserved in the alternative when the facts are ambiguous. The Court’s reaffirmation that a felony (aggravated assault) cannot be “dressed down” to a misdemeanor to support an involuntary manslaughter charge also limits a common defensive strategy in cases involving firearms and heated domestic confrontations.

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