Background
Edward Latko was convicted in 1994 of aggravated criminal sexual assault. Before his prison sentence ended, the State sought his civil commitment under Illinois’s Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, and a jury found him to be a sexually violent person.
In 2022, Latko petitioned for discharge. At the resulting jury hearing, the State had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he still had a qualifying mental disorder and that it made future sexual violence substantially probable. The State’s expert diagnosed Latko with pedophilic disorder, paraphilia, and narcissistic personality disorder and assessed his risk as average to above average. Latko’s expert disputed the current diagnoses and placed greater weight on Latko’s age, health conditions, and lack of infractions in custody.
The Court’s Holding
The appellate court affirmed the denial of discharge. The jury’s finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence because it was entitled to resolve the competing experts’ disagreements over diagnosis, risk-assessment methods, and protective factors. The State’s expert could rely on the underlying conduct of Latko’s prior sexual offenses, and the court declined to impose a rule requiring use of the Stable-2007 assessment.
The court also rejected Latko’s claims of trial error. Testimony about his lack of treatment participation was admissible as a basis for the State expert’s opinion and did not improperly shift the burden of proof. The prosecutor’s closing remarks properly addressed the experts’ disagreement over whether aging reduced Latko’s risk, and the discussion of prior offenses was tied to challenging the defense expert’s diagnosis. Latko forfeited his jury-instruction claim by failing to adequately develop it on appeal.
Key Takeaways
- Jurors may choose between conflicting expert opinions in sexually violent person discharge proceedings.
- Prior sexually violent conduct may inform an expert’s current diagnosis, though it is not alone sufficient to establish a current mental disorder.
- The State was not required to use a particular actuarial or dynamic-risk instrument to meet its clear-and-convincing burden.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores the substantial deference Illinois reviewing courts give juries evaluating expert evidence in civil-commitment discharge cases. Methodological disputes over actuarial scores, dynamic risks, age, health, and treatment participation generally go to evidentiary weight rather than legal sufficiency.