Background
Following a July 16, 2020, incident, Steven Davis was charged by indictment with the first-degree murder of Berasheet Mitchell, the attempted murder of Jihad Mitchell, and aggravated discharge of a firearm. The State proceeded on two counts of first-degree murder: Count V alleged intentional or knowing killing under 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), and Count VI alleged killing with knowledge that the acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm under 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2). The evidence established that Davis, who had been in a relationship with Imani Mitchell that ended weeks prior, arrived at the Mitchell family home and argued with Imani. When Berasheet and Jihad Mitchell intervened and told Davis to leave, Davis drew a firearm, pulled the slide, and fired. Berasheet died from a gunshot wound to the abdomen. Davis fled and later messaged Imani that he was “sorry” and had done “something wrong, really wrong.”
At trial, defense counsel requested jury instructions on involuntary manslaughter and second-degree murder. The trial court, presided over by Honorable Alfredo Maldonado, agreed to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter over the State’s objection. During deliberations, the jury sent five notes to the court. The first note asked whether the word “intent” applied to all three subpropositions of the second proposition in the first-degree murder instruction; the trial court instructed the jury to “refer to the plain wording of the instruction.” The second note asked whether “intent” was required to sustain a guilty verdict, stating the wording was ambiguous; the court responded, “Please follow the instructions as worded.” After approximately five and one-half hours of deliberations, the jury sent a third note asking what would happen if they could not agree, and the court instructed them to continue. A fourth note declared an impasse, prompting the court to give a People v. Prim instruction over the defense’s objection. The jury then requested and received a redacted transcript before finding Davis guilty of first-degree murder. The trial court merged Count V into Count VI and sentenced Davis to 35 years in prison.
The Court’s Holding
The Illinois Appellate Court, First District, affirmed Davis’s conviction, rejecting his claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request pattern jury instructions defining the mental states of recklessness, intent, and knowledge. Applying the Strickland standard, the court reviewed the legal question de novo while deferring to any factual findings unless against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Regarding recklessness, the court acknowledged that the Committee Note to Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction Criminal No. 7.07 (involuntary manslaughter) directs courts to give Instruction 5.01 defining recklessness, and that failing to do so may constitute error under People v. Cook. However, citing People v. Lemke, the court held that counsel’s decision not to request the recklessness instruction was a matter of trial strategy generally immune from ineffective assistance claims. The court noted that counsel elicited testimony about Davis’s apology and characterized the shooting as a “deadly mistake” and “accident,” reasoning that counsel could have strategically decided to allow the jury to define recklessness in a manner more beneficial to the defense than the legal definition requiring “conscious disregard” of a risk.
Regarding intent and knowledge, the court held that these terms have plain meanings within the jury’s common knowledge and need not be defined absent a specific jury request or manifested confusion. Although the jury sent notes asking about the applicability of “intent” to the subpropositions, the court determined these questions concerned the grammatical structure of the instruction rather than requests for definitions of the terms. Because the jury did not ask for definitions and expressed no confusion about the meanings of intent or knowledge, counsel’s failure to request Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions Criminal Nos. 5.01A and 5.01B did not constitute deficient performance.
Key Takeaways
- Counsel’s decision regarding which jury instructions to tender is generally considered trial strategy immune from ineffective assistance claims, unless the omitted instruction was so critical that its absence denied the defendant a fair trial.
- While failing to define “recklessness” when instructing on involuntary manslaughter may be error under People v. Cook, such error does not automatically establish deficient performance if counsel made a strategic decision to rely on a more favorable lay understanding of the term.
- Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions defining “intent” and “knowledge” (Nos. 5.01A and 5.01B) are not required absent a specific jury request or manifested confusion, as these terms have plain meanings within the jury’s common knowledge.
- Jury questions about the grammatical structure or applicability of instructions do not necessarily constitute requests for definitions of mental state terms or expressions of confusion requiring additional definitional instructions.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the high bar for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel based on jury instruction strategy. Even when a trial court commits instructional error—such as failing to provide a mandatory companion instruction defining recklessness—appellate courts will not second-guess counsel’s tactical decisions if a reasonable strategic basis existed. The ruling also clarifies that jury notes questioning the structure of instructions do not automatically trigger the requirement to provide definitional instructions for mental states like intent and knowledge, distinguishing between confusion about how to apply instructions and confusion about what terms mean.