Background
Richard Lawson entered Andrea Perschon’s Elk Grove Village home seeking mail he believed had been delivered there. Perschon testified that Lawson entered through an unlocked back door without permission, argued with her about the mail, and left after she told him to get out. Lawson later told police that he opened the door, poked his head inside, and called out to determine whether anyone was home.
After a bench trial, the circuit court found Lawson guilty of misdemeanor criminal trespass to a residence and acquitted him of the felony charge because the State had not proved that he knew people were inside. At sentencing, the State asserted that Lawson had a 1990 Class 3 felony unlawful-use-of-a-weapon conviction, based on purported fingerprint records. Defense counsel disputed that assertion, and the State introduced no supporting evidence.
The Court’s Holding
The appellate court reversed Lawson’s sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Although Lawson had not preserved his challenge to the alleged felony conviction in his motion to reconsider sentence, the court held that counsel was ineffective for failing to do so.
The State presented no evidence establishing either that Lawson’s fingerprints matched records from a 1990 case or that he had been convicted of a felony. The trial court nevertheless relied on the unsupported assertion when it found Lawson was “a convicted felon” and rejected supervision. There was a reasonable probability that, without that improper consideration, Lawson could have received a lesser sentence, including supervision or a reduced fine.
Key Takeaways
- A sentencing court may not rely on an alleged prior conviction that the State has not supported with evidence.
- Counsel’s failure to preserve a meritorious sentencing challenge can establish ineffective assistance.
- The misdemeanor conviction remains intact; only Lawson’s sentence was reversed and remanded.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores that contested criminal-history assertions must be proved, not merely represented by the prosecution, when they affect sentencing. It also illustrates that an ineffective-assistance claim may provide relief where counsel fails to properly preserve an improper-factor challenge.
This Rule 23 order is nonprecedential except in the limited circumstances permitted by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(e)(1).