Background
From June 2017 to February 2019, K.T., then between the ages of six and eight, lived in the McHenry County home of Richard Rowland, her step-grandfather by marriage. K.T.’s family had moved in temporarily while her mother and stepfather recovered financially from a divorce and got on their feet. K.T. testified that Rowland sexually assaulted her nearly every day during this period, framing the abuse as “punishment” for minor rule infractions. She described bleeding and bruising after the assaults, disposed of bloody underwear to conceal the evidence, and stayed silent because Rowland threatened to evict the entire family if she told anyone.
K.T. did not disclose the abuse until March 2024, when she learned that Rowland and his wife were babysitting her younger sister. She first told her therapist, then cooperated with law enforcement. A physical examination was normal, which both a prosecution and defense expert confirmed was consistent with roughly 90–95% of child sexual abuse cases, particularly given the years that had elapsed since the last incident. No recordings were found on electronic equipment seized from Rowland’s home. Following a jury trial in McHenry County, Rowland was convicted on three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and sentenced to three consecutive 12-year prison terms, for an aggregate of 36 years.
Rowland appealed on five grounds: (1) the insufficiency of the evidence given the absence of corroborating witnesses; (2) the trial court’s exclusion of purported prior false accusations by K.T.; (3) denial of a subpoena for K.T.’s mental health records without an in camera review; (4) admission of expert testimony on child abuse accommodation syndrome; (5) denial of his completeness-doctrine request to include additional excerpts from his recorded police statement; and (6) alleged prejudicial ex parte communications between the court and the jury on Halloween night.
The Court’s Holding
The Second District affirmed on all grounds. On sufficiency, the court held that the absence of corroborating observations by the other adults in the home did not establish reasonable doubt as a matter of law. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational jury could draw the competing inference that Rowland was simply effective at maintaining secrecy — an inference reinforced by K.T.’s testimony about his specific concealment tactics, the corroborated detail of the missing underwear, and expert testimony that non-offending caregivers almost never witness ongoing abuse. The court declined to substitute its judgment for the jury’s credibility determination.
The court found no abuse of discretion in any of the challenged evidentiary rulings. Admission of the accommodation-syndrome expert testimony was proper because it explained behaviors — delayed disclosure, piecemeal revelation, and failure of other adults to detect the abuse — that might otherwise seem implausible to jurors. The court also rejected the argument that the trial judge’s Halloween-night inquiry created a prejudicial ex parte communication: once the judge learned the jury wanted to go home, she disclosed that fact to both parties in open court, both parties weighed in, and the judge ultimately instructed the jury to keep deliberating. There was no communication that bypassed the parties or pressured the jury toward a particular verdict.
The appellate court noted the order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and carries no precedential value except in the limited circumstances permitted by Rule 23(e)(1).
Key Takeaways
- A victim’s testimony alone can sustain a conviction for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child; the absence of corroborating eyewitnesses is not evidence of innocence, particularly where the record supports an inference of deliberate concealment by the abuser.
- Expert testimony on child abuse accommodation syndrome is properly admitted to explain why children delay disclosure, report piecemeal, and why other household members typically remain unaware of ongoing abuse — all factors that might otherwise undermine the victim’s credibility with jurors.
- A judge’s mid-deliberation inquiry into jurors’ scheduling conflicts does not constitute prejudicial ex parte communication if the judge promptly discloses the communication to both parties in open court, solicits their input, and then instructs the jury to continue deliberating.
- A normal physical examination years after repeated sexual abuse does not negate the abuse; both the prosecution and defense experts agreed that normal findings are expected in the overwhelming majority of child sexual abuse cases.
Why It Matters
This case reinforces established Illinois doctrine that child sexual abuse prosecutions can rest on the victim’s testimony without physical evidence or corroborating eyewitnesses, especially where expert testimony on accommodation syndrome contextualizes delayed disclosure and the failure of surrounding adults to detect the abuse. Defense arguments built on the silence of other household members face a high bar: courts will treat that silence as consistent with — not contradictory of — a pattern of secretive abuse.
The Halloween-deliberation episode also offers a practical reminder for trial courts: any communication between the bench and a deliberating jury, even a logistical one relayed through a bailiff, must be disclosed to counsel immediately and handled transparently on the record. Because the judge here corrected course in open court and ultimately sided with the parties’ preference to keep the jury deliberating, the Second District found no reversible error — but the incident illustrates how easily routine scheduling courtesy can create appellate issues if not handled with care.